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With the establishment of universal conscription into the Israel Defense Forces 
(IDF) and reserve duty lasting much of the average male’s adult life, the IDF became one 
of the central institutions of the State of Israel.  The occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, 
East Jerusalem, the Sinai, and Golan in 1967, forced Israelis to re-examine their deeply 
shared, or hegemonic views about security, peace, and war, especially regarding the 
employment of the IDF.  This thesis examines the effects of Israeli political divisions, 
specifically with regard to the occupied territories, and further, how those political 
cleavages affect the employment of the IDF.  Its first case study examines the progression 
of selective refusal to serve in the IDF from the extreme left of the Israeli political 
spectrum to the center-left, from the Lebanon War through the current uprising.  The 
second case study examines the relationship between the IDF and Fundamentalist Jewish 
settlers in the Occupied Territories, emphasizing resistance to settlement removal over 
time.  This thesis concludes with prescriptions for redefining the borders of the State of 
Israel in order to prevent a loss of consensus regarding the legitimacy of the state from 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE IDF AND ZIONIST HEGEMONY 
A. ISRAEL AND THE IDF: HEGEMONIC PROJECTS 
This thesis applies Gramsci’s concept of hegemony – an intellectual discourse or 
worldview so dominant within a society that it becomes “common sense” – to the role of 
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Israeli national life.  The State of Israel is unique in 
that it is entirely a construction of political entrepreneurs, the Zionists.  Zionism emerged 
from the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century as the pursuit of a nation-state 
to serve as a homeland for Jews.  Zionists chose Israel as the site of their homeland for its 
significance in Jewish religion and culture.  Jews recognized Israel as their historic 
homeland and bided the days until their return to it.  This common vision of the 
importance of Israel in Jewish mythology was not sufficient to impel the creation of a 
Jewish state.  Rather, Israel was a symbol Zionists used to rally support in the creation of 
a modern Jewish state. 
Although many Jews were citizens or subjects of modern states, anti-Semitism or 
cultural differences made participation in the institutions of modern statehood largely 
alien to the Jewish people.  Zionists thus saw the need to create an Israeli identity, 
nationhood apart from merely Jewish identity, privileging Israeli Jews above other Jews 
to encourage emigration, and privileging Jews above other nationalities within Israel, to 
make Jewishness a sine qua non of Israeliness.  The second half of their hegemonic 
project was therefore to convince Jews coming to Israel of the need for the civil religion 
of Zionism, making participation in the state of Israel more central to Israeli life than 
even Jewishness.   
Participation in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was an obvious site for the 
creation of Zionist hegemony and the acculturation of Jews in Israel to Zionism.  Conflict 
with the local Arab inhabitants of Israel whom the Zionist enterprise sought to displace 
created the need for communal defense of the Jewish community before the state of Israel 
existed.  The civil strife of the Yishuv period mutated into inter-state and inter-communal 
war following independence in 1948, giving Israel the patina of a state born in conflict.  
For the state of Israel, conflict with Arab neighbors never ended.  Rather, Israelis 
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characterized the state of relations with their neighboring states as a prolonged war, 
interrupted by cease-fire, never settled.  Unending conflict merited the creation of a 
defense establishment equal to the task of constant readiness in a war for the survival of 
the nation.  Thus, the IDF conscripts, with few exceptions, all able-bodied eighteen year-
old Israelis for three years of compulsory service.  The state maintains a cadre of 
professional soldiers beyond their three years of compulsory service in order to train and 
lead the draftees.  To augment this body in times of crisis, the state maintains a huge 
reserve force relative to its population, consisting of most able-bodied adult males until 
their fiftieth birthday, and adult females until marriage.  Reservists typically serve one 
month of active duty each year, often in front-line combat units.  Israel extracts more 
from its citizens, in terms of military service, than any other state in the world. 
In the face of unending conflict for state survival, hegemonic consensus about this 
extractive arrangement is not problematic.  This was most certainly the case in the early 
days of Israeli statehood, wherein the idea of ein brera, that Israelis had no choice other 
than to fight for their survival, pervaded Israeli considerations of their strategic situation.  
However, employment of the IDF other than in the course of state survival problematizes 
the hegemonic enterprise that is the IDF.  This thesis seeks to illustrate challenges to 
Israeli hegemonic consensus regarding the employment of the IDF.  As military historian 
Martin Van Creveld states, “For decades on end it was…ein brera and the utter sense of 
determination that went with it that provided the real dynamo behind Israeli military 
prowess.  Perhaps it was predictable that, if it went, everything else would go as well.”1 
 
B. THE ZIONISTS & THE IDF: HEGEMONIC CONSENSUS 
The use of the term “hegemonic consensus” in this thesis rather than just 
“consensus” is a conscious effort to characterize Israeli attitudes toward the IDF and 
toward the state as the result of Zionist entrepreneurs’ hegemonic enterprise.2  Therefore, 
                                                 
1 Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, a Critical History of the Israel Defense Force, (New 
York: Public Affairs Press, 2002) 126. 
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2 In discussing the Gramscian concept of hegemonic conceptualizations of states, especially with 
regard to decolonization, and attempts by religious Zionists to alter the prevailing hegemonic consensus, 
this thesis is indebted to Ian Lustick’s book Unsettled States, Disputed Lands (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1993).  Lustick discusses hegemonic conceptualizations of Israel and the occupied 
territories in comparison to England and Ireland and France and Algeria.  Although the focus of this thesis 
a brief explanation of Gramscian hegemony is relevant.  Entrepreneurs attempt to 
persuade other groups in society to accept their political and cultural values.  In the case 
of Israel, the entrepreneurs were Zionists.  Hegemony is the product of that persuasion; 
the values of entrepreneurs become common sense to the citizens of the society.  Once a 
set of values achieves hegemony in a society, changing or even debating those values 
becomes difficult because to do so is to challenge the basic tenets of the society.  
According to Gramsci, to alter hegemonic consensus without a violent social revolution, 
one must wage a War of Position, a protracted struggle across the institutions of civil 
society.  
Israel is the product of Zionists’ hegemonic enterprise, thus its institutions are 
products of Zionist hegemony.  Differentiation from the Diaspora was essential to the 
Zionist state-making project, thus the Zionists constructed a civil identity of which the 
IDF was a primary site for socialization and acculturation.  Zionists constructed Israeli 
identity and culture parri passu with the Israeli state.  The Zionist construction of Israeli 
Jewry is that of “yahudat shririm (muscular Jewry),” the continuation of a lineage of 
biblical heroes in Israel, and a separate identity from the demoralized Diaspora Jews; 
Israeli Jews are able to defend themselves.3   
According to Israeli sociologist Sara Helman, “War-making and state-making 
have been closely connected in Israel as elsewhere.  However, war and conflict 
management in Israel…has not been limited to the state-making stage.  War and conflict 
management have turned into a permanent feature of the socio-political order.”4  In that 
respect, the depiction of unceasing conflict with neighboring states enhances the 
extractive capability of the Israeli state.  The perpetuity of conflict privileges the IDF as 
“the one great institution around which a young and heterogeneous nation could rally.”5  
Zionists capitalized on the unconcluded war for independence to rally Israeli citizens 
                                                 
is primarily the implications of occupation for hegemonic consensus regarding the IDF, Lustick’s 
discussions of Gramscian methods of challenging existing hegemony is particularly relevant. 
       3 Van Creveld, 11. 
4 Sara Helman, “Militarism and the Construction of the Life-World of Israeli Males,” The Military and 
Militarism in Israeli Society, eds. Edna Lomsky-Federer and Eyal Ben-Ari (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 
1999) 212. 
5 Van Creveld, 123. 
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under the banner of the IDF; thus, the defense forces are essential to the hegemonic 
construction of the state of Israel.  With respect to the constant embattled status of the 
state of Israel, ein brera is more than just a slogan; rather it is a key enabling concept of 
Israeli military doctrine.  “No Choice” is the hegemonic definition of Israel’s conflict 
with its neighbors.  Ha’Aretz military correspondent Ze’ev Schiff illustrates features of 
IDF doctrine that re-emphasize the notion that Israel has no choice other than a constant 
state of preparedness for war. 
Few Against Many – The fact that any armed conflict will pit the small 
population of Israel against an Arab camp many times its size has been a 
salient characteristic of the Arab-Israeli conflict since its inception…  A 
War of Survival – Unlike other nations, Israel faces an enemy whose aim 
is not merely to defeat her army or to conquer a specified area of land.  
The intention of the Arab governments has been…the liquidation of the 
Jewish state…The Strategy of Attrition – The Middle East dispute is 
marked by a flagrant asymmetry in the objectives of the two sides.  
Whereas the Arabs wish to destroy Israel, the IDF could not adopt a 
similar policy vis-à-vis the Arab world…  Geographic Pressures – 
Israel…was in a grave geo-strategic position prior to the Six Day 
War…This situation gave rise to a deep fear of a sudden Arab attack, 
which in turn produced an acute awareness that Israel would always have 
to strike first if she were to survive.6 
These strategic characteristics became the “facts” of the international situation in 
the Middle East for Israelis, evidence of the hegemony of the Zionist project.  As such, 
the state of Israel, in support of the IDF was able to extract much more from its populace 
than any other industrialized state.  Hegemonic consensus that Israel was always at war 
produced a militarized Israeli state.  The degree of militarization is so great that, “Most 
Israeli boys and girls at the age of fourteen are required to join a paramilitary 
organization called the GADNA (a Hebrew acronym for youth battalions).”7  Further, 
conscription and reserve duty require the devotion of years of adulthood to military 
service.  However, most Israelis believe that opting out of service as an abnormal or 
deviant act.8  As Schiff states, “The willingness to serve in the IDF is almost axiomatic.”9   
                                                 
6 Ze’ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985) 115-
7. 
7 Ibid, 102. 
8 Helman, 203. 
9 Schiff, 104. 
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 C. HEGEMONIC CHALLENGES 
It is the centrality of service in the IDF to Israeli citizenship, and the perception of 
the appropriateness of the militarized state, that make challenges to that axiom 
hegemonic challenges.  These challenges to hegemony are the problematique of this 
thesis.  According to Israeli anthropologist Myron Aronoff, “Controversial wars and even 
negotiations and treaties terminating conflict provide contexts for the escalation of 
political divisions.”10  In Israel however, since military service borne out of conflict has 
attained the level of hegemonic consensus, controversial wars, and the loss of ein brera 
through war (as in Lebanon) or through peace treaty (as with Egypt and Jordan) challenge 
hegemonic consensus rather than incumbent-level, i.e. the prevailing political consensus. 
The original Zionists’ success in creating a hegemonic conceptualization of 
Israeliness did not mean that alternative conceptualizations did not exist.  Religious 
Zionism, an alternative conceptualization that characterized the state of Israel as a step in 
the process of messianic redemption, attempted its own project to alter hegemonic 
consensus as to the defining characteristics of Israel.  The territorial windfall that befell 
Israel following the 1967 War was the catalyst for the religious Zionists project: to bring 
the occupied territories under Jewish domination, preparing the way for the messiah.  As 
such, these entrepreneurs attempted to erase the pre-1967 border from Israeli 
consciousness, and render these territories inseparable from the state of Israel.  The 
original Zionist hegemonic consensus about the need for territorial defensive depth 
assisted their project.  Further, they attempted to settle the occupied territories and 
integrate them into Israeli culture.  Conflict with the Arab inhabitants of the territories, 
and peace treaties with Arab neighbors outside the territories, derailed the hegemonic 
project of the religious Zionists.  With the specter of interstate war removed, and given 
the huge disparity of power between the Palestinians and Israelis, conflict within the 
territories was completely alien to the existing hegemonic understanding of the threat to 
Israel and the employment of the IDF. 
 
                                                 
10 Myron Aronoff, “Wars as Catalysts for Political and Cultural Change,” The Military and Militarism 
in Israeli Society, eds. Edna Lomsky-Federer and Eyal Ben-Ari (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999) 38. 
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D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis studies each of the preceding hegemonic challenges, using case studies 
taken from movements from each end of the Israeli political spectrum.  I chose these 
cases to illustrate the polarizing effect of occupation on attitudes towards the employment 
of the IDF.  That the final product of each challenge to hegemonic consensus calls for 
selective refusal to serve in the IDF based upon objections to its employment is 
particularly interesting.   
The first case explored in this thesis discusses the progress of Yesh Gvul, a 
protest group that originally called for selective refusal to serve in the Lebanon War.  At 
its outset, even committed Israeli pacifists considered Yesh Gvul to be an aberrant group, 
advocating an aberrant form of protest.  In the intervening two decades between the 
Lebanon War and the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the selective refusal of Yesh Gvul has become 
more acceptable.  Growing acceptance of Yesh Gvul comes from Israeli hegemonic 
consensus that the IDF is a defensive instrument.  Justification for the Lebanon war as 
defensive in nature was problematic, and thus the Lebanon campaign engendered a level 
of anti-war protest then unseen in Israel.  The employment of the IDF to put down the 
first Intifada was an affront to the hegemonic conceptualization of the IDF as an 
instrument of national survival; the Palestinians could not threaten the existence of the 
state of Israel.   
Thus, the case of Yesh Gvul illustrates the challenge occupation poses to the 
hegemonic consensus Zionists created.  Employment of the IDF in the absence of a threat 
to state survival, in the absence of ein brera, changes consensus about the 
appropriateness of the IDF from hegemonic to incumbent-level, thus open for debate.  
Support for the IDF was once monolithic, but as a result of the occupation, it became 
problematic.   
Selective refusal of Yesh Gvul is a protest movement of the Israeli left, a protest 
against occupation.  That a similar phenomenon would occur on the fringe of the Israeli 
right is therefore all the more interesting a phenomenon.  The Israeli government 
employed the IDF to remove settlements in the Sinai, and encountered little resistance.  
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The Israeli right is determined to resist any attempt to repeat that feat in the West Bank or 
to a lesser degree, the Gaza Strip. 
Jewish settlement of the West Bank and Gaza is essential to the hegemonic 
project of religious Zionists to alter the Israeli conceptualization of their state, from a 
normal state to a sacred state, paving the way for ultimate redemption.  The acquisition of 
territory in 1967 was a catalytic event for religious Zionists, inspiring them to seek means 
to achieve the incorporation of the occupied territories into Israel.  The willingness of the 
Israeli government to exchange territory for normal relations following the Camp David 
Accords illustrated to religious Zionists that mere settlement in the territories was not 
sufficient, rather they had to affect a change in Israeli hegemonic consensus of the Land 
of Israel, and the purpose of the state of Israel.  The hegemonic project involved 
settlement construction, and political and extra-parliamentary activity.  The first Intifada, 
and the resulting Oslo Process, illustrated the failure of the religious Zionists to achieve 
hegemonic consensus.  However, their incumbent-level challenge to Israeli consensus 
also challenges the IDF.  Political organizations that grew from religious Zionists’ 
hegemonic project created a political power bloc among the religious Zionists, making 
employment of the IDF to remove settlements politically difficult.  A further example of 
the incumbent-level challenge posed by religious Zionism is the nascent movement 
among religious soldiers, heeding rabbis’ calls to refuse to remove settlement outposts. 
 
E. THE POTENTIAL FOR UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT AND A 
RETURN TO HEGEMONY 
The first Intifada revived the “Green Line.”  Israelis regained their awareness of 
the pre-1967 border inasmuch as most of the violence was contained on the opposite side 
of pre-1967 Israel.  The subsequent negotiations paved the way for Israeli disengagement 
from the occupied territories, and illustrated the failure of religious Zionists to alter the 
hegemonic conceptualization of Israel.  The violence of the Al-Aqsa Intifada has changed 
perceptions about the negotiated settlement with the Palestinians.  Unprecedented 
violence on both sides of the Green Line diminishes its place in Israeli consensus, and 
discourages those on the Left who favor withdrawal.  However, the desire for a secure 
7 
border favors unilateral withdrawal from much of the occupied territory, in order to 
isolate the majority of Israelis from the majority of Palestinians.   
That Israelis still envision a border, although not exactly the original Green Line, 
illustrates the incompleteness of the religious Zionists’ hegemonic project.  That both 
ends of the political spectrum in Israel call for selective refusal to serve in the IDF 
illustrates that the original Zionist hegemonic consensus, a state that privileges Israeli 
Jews over other Jews, and Jewish Israelis over others in Israel, is in jeopardy.  According 
to Israeli sociologist Gershon Shafir, “Decolonization [i.e. withdrawal] is justified by the 
rationale that territorial separation of Israelis and Palestinians will provide security to the 
former and sovereignty to the latter.”11  Although withdrawal is a seemingly 
insurmountable challenge to incumbent-level consensus, it is still in the realm of the 
political, not the hegemonic.  That the status quo of occupation engenders hegemonic 
level challenges to the IDF illustrates that either the status quo must change or, as Shafir 
states, “Israel [will] effectively [enter] the post-Zionist era, where the traditional values of 
the colonial society – especially settlement and long-term military service…are likely to 
be seen as unnecessary burdens for individuals in a society.”12  This thesis concludes that 
Israel will withdraw from some of the occupied territories in order to maintain the Zionist 





                                                 
11 Gershon Shafir, “Israeli Decolonization and Critical Sociology,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25, 
no. 3 (Spring 1996) 33. 
12 Ibid. 
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II. HEGEMONIC CHALLENGES TO THE IDF: YESH GVUL 
AND SELECTIVE REFUSAL  
A. SERVICE AND SELECTIVE REFUSAL 
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, Israeli national mythology depicts 
an army of citizen-soldiers, always ready to fight in defense of a nation perpetually 
challenged by outside enemies, bent on its destruction.  The socialist origins of the Israel 
Defense Forces, as well as the constant warfare and external security threats of Israel’s 
early history, led to the Israeli public’s acceptance of a militarized state, involving 
compulsory active military service, followed by a long period in the reserves.  As 
political scientist Gad Barzilai states, “Service in the IDF had come to symbolize the 
Israeli citizen’s membership in the Jewish-Zionist community.”13  When hegemonic 
consensus exists regarding the just application of military force, the militarized society is 
not problematic.  However, when the consensus about the employment of the IDF is 
equivocal, the IDF reflects the diversity of Israeli public opinion, thus problematizing the 
employment of the armed forces.  Selective refusal to serve, a phenomenon that began 
during Israel’s Lebanon War and has intensified during the two Intifadas, reflects Israel’s 
societal divisions.  This phenomenon illustrates the lack of consensus among Israelis 
regarding the final status of the occupied territories, the continued existence of a security 
threat to Israel, and the just employment of the IDF.   
Selective refusal to serve differs from conscientious objection, and those who 
selectively refuse (commonly and heretafter known as “refuseniks”) differ from 
conscientious objectors.  According to historian of the Israeli peace movement Mordechai 
Bar-On, in Israel’s history conscientious objectors have generally been, “political 
pacifists who objected to war in itself, and did not necessarily pass judgment on the 
specific political circumstances or merits of a particular war.”14  Refuseniks, on the 
contrary, are usually reservists who have completed a full tour of active duty, and due to 
their political views, or their own negative experiences occurring during service in 
                                                 
13 Gad Barzilai, Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order; a Jewish Democracy in the Middle East 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) 189. 
14 Mordechai Bar-On, In Pursuit of Peace, a History of the Israeli Peace Movement (Washington DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1996) 146. 
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Lebanon or the Occupied territories, have elected to refuse to serve in support of 
operations they deem unlawful or immoral.  The first instances of selective refusal to 
serve in the IDF occurred during the 1982 Lebanon War.  The volume of service 
members selectively refusing to serve rises during heightened periods of conflict, just as 
the debate over the proper employment of the IDF intensifies.  As the conflict subsides, 
the debate over selective refusal becomes more academic; however, each call-up of 
reserves contains service members who refuse to serve in the occupied territories.  In this 
aspect, the importance of selective refusal and its place in Israeli public discourse 
parallels the ebbs and flows of the Israeli peace movement.  Among members of the 
Israeli peace movement, and within the political left in general, the view of selective 
refusal has been ambivalent, varying between tacit support and outright condemnation.  
However, the level of support for refusniks among the Israeli peace camp, as well as in 
the general Israeli population, has increased with each successive conflict since 1982.  In 
this chapter, I will trace the history of selective refusal in Israel, especially the Yesh Gvul 
(alternately, “There is a Limit,” or “There is a Border”) organization, which supports 
refusniks.  I will place it in the context of the peace movement, and furthermore, in the 
context of public discourse regarding the appropriate role of the IDF since 1967.  Finally, 
I will attempt to illustrate my conclusion that selective refusal demonstrates the deep 
cleavages in Israeli society regarding issues as central to Israel as its borders and the level 
of security threats to the state. 
 
B. HEGEMONIC CONSENSUS, “NO-CHOICE WARS,” AND 1982 AS A 
POINT OF DEPARTURE  
Before Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, every IDF military campaign had 
overwhelming support of the Israeli public.  Consensus opinion held that each military 
action was undertaken as a last resort, in response to an outside threat to Israel’s national 
survival.  According to Efraim Inbar of Hebrew University, “conventional academic 
knowledge, which I subscribe to in this case, views the wars of 1948, 1969-70, and of 
1973 as purely defensive, while the wars of 1956 and 1967 are classified respectively as 
preventative and preemptive.”15  Inasmuch as Israeli forces were committed to defend the 
                                                 
15 Efraim Inbar, “The ‘No Choice War’ Debate in Israel,” in The Conflict with the Arabs in Israeli 
Politics and Society Volume  7, ed. Ian Lustick (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994) 105. 
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state against a perceived threat to its existence, these wars engendered no public debate 
over their correctness. 
The 1982 invasion of Lebanon stands out as a point of departure because there 
was no hegemonic consensus that the casus belli, namely rocket attacks launched from 
PLO-controlled areas of Lebanon, was a legitimate threat to Israel’s existence that 
merited the invasion of a sovereign country.  Around the time of the July, 1981, Israel-
PLO cease-fire, the danger posed to Israel by the Palestinian (or in Israeli parlance, 
“terrorist”) rockets in Lebanon was a hotly contested topic among Israel’s government 
and body politic.  “Never before in Israel had a forthcoming war been so universally and 
fiercely debated as in 1981.”16  Out of the parliamentary, ministerial, and societal debate 
about the appropriate employment of the IDF leading up to the 1982 war, the term “no 
choice war” (discussed in the introduction to this thesis as the principle of ein brera) 
became popularized and germane.  According to Inbar, those who opposed military 
action against the PLO characterized the “no choice” distinction as, “normative – a just 
war.  The war is not willed by Israel, but is forced upon it by its opponents.”17  The five 
previous Israeli wars were “no choice wars,” based upon the fact that Israel was forced to 
fight them.  Initially, those who favored military intervention in Lebanon attempted to 
conform to this understanding of the “no choice war,” and present the threat posed by 
PLO artillery as sufficient to justify IDF action.  As the war progressed, Inbar states: 
It became increasingly clearer that the war had goals beyond the 
elimination of the artillery threat to the northern settlements.  Ousting 
Arafat from Beirut and the Syrians from Lebanon, where a friendly 
government was to be established, did not command the support of all 
Israelis.  The government spokesman had an increasingly difficult time 
portraying the war as a defensive ‘no choice’ campaign.18 
At that point, those supporting the war, especially Prime Minister Begin, 
attempted to reclassify the meaning of the “no choice war” debate.  Begin chose to 
classify the 1982 war, along with the 1967 and 1956 wars as, “wars by choice.”  
According to Inbar: 
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Their distinct common feature was, in Begin’s opinion, the Israeli 
initiative to open hostilities.  In contrast, the ‘no choice war’ was 
described as one in which the Arabs had the initiative…  Therefore, Israel 
would be wrong in aspiring to wage ‘no choice wars.’  It is not wise to 
wait until a ‘no choice war’ situation develops.19 
The appropriate classification of the 1982 war as a “war by choice,” or a “no 
choice war,” is not important to this study.  In fact the dichotomy is false, and only serves 
to illustrate the hegemonic consensus that supported all of Israel’s wars prior to 1982 – 
the general populace believed in each circumstance that war was the only option.  That 
there was a debate surrounding the choice of war in 1982 however is important to the 
argument presented here.  Previous conflicts conformed to the ein brera standard 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis, thus they conformed to the hegemonic 
consensus that the IDF was a defensive organization.  The lack of conformity of Israeli 
public opinion in support of the IDF incursion into Lebanon gave rise to Israel’s first 
instances of public opposition to military action.   
 It is important to note that public outcry over the conduct of the Lebanon War did 
not begin with the initial incursion into Lebanon.  The government’s campaign to 
convince the public that its invasion had only defensive strategic aims, even naming it 
“The Peace for the Galilee Campaign,” served to mute public condemnation to the war in 
its initial stages.  According to Mapam (an opposition party that was vocally anti-war) 
Member of the Knesset (MK) Victor Shem-Tov: 
Everything must be done so that Israel wins the war… Obviously, the 
entire controversy surrounding the events that took place prior to the 
commencement of hostilities still exists.  This controversy has not been 
expressed to date, because our soldiers are still fighting on the front 
lines.20 
The Israeli consensus, that national unity was essential during wartime, caused 
majority Israeli public opinion to support the war at its outset.21  However, as mentioned 
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earlier, the scope of the war far exceeded the initially stated goals, and as consensus 
eroded, vocal, public opposition grew. 
 The debate over the propriety of the Lebanon campaign, before the initiation of 
hostilities, took place in the public, the ministerial, the military, as well as in the 
parliamentary arena.  However, the self-censoring actions of Knesset members and 
ministers while hostilities were ongoing strengthened Israel’s heretofore minute extra-
parliamentary opposition.  Peace Now, an activist group founded in 1978, but only 
marginally supported before 1982, attracted over 100,000 people to its July 3, 1982 
rally22 and over 400,000 people to a rally in protest against the Sabra and Shatila 
massacres on September 22.23  Media outlets covered the growing protest movement to 
illustrate their own and public dissatisfaction with the manner by which the government 
obscured its aims, and misled the country into a war.  “Studies of extra-parliamentary 
opposition… state that dissatisfaction with the ability of a party to serve as a channel of 
communication will result in extra-party activity and the formation of protest groups.”24 
 
C. SELECTIVE REFUSAL TO SERVE IN LEBANON, THE FORMATION 
OF YESH GVUL, & DISSATISFACTION IN THE IDF 
A protest group that rose to prominence during the Lebanon war, not for its 
overwhelming size, but for its audacious manner of protest, was Yesh Gvul.  This group 
consisted of reserve soldiers who refused to serve in Lebanon if activated, and their 
supporters.  The original leaders of Yesh Gvul were two Peace Now activists who held 
reserve commissions in the IDF as company commanders.  Ishai Mehunin and Yehuda 
Meltzer began their active dissent by organizing reservists to sign a petition to Defense 
Minister Sharon, stating: 
We officers and soldiers in reserve service appeal to you not to send us to 
Lebanon, since we can endure no more…  It is now clear that by means of 
this war you are trying to solve the Palestinian problem militarily, but 
ution to the problem of a nation…  Instead of Peace there is no military sol
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24 Barzilai, 145, advises the reader to consult Political Action, by S Barnes & M Kasse (Sage 
Publications, 1979). 
13 
in the Galilee you have brought about a war, the end of which may not yet 
be seen.  This war, these lies, this occupation has no national consent…  
We took an oath to defend the peace and security of the state of Israel.  
We remain loyal to this oath.  Therefore, we appeal to you to enable us to 
serve our reserve duty inside the boundaries of the state of Israel, not on 
the soil of Lebanon.25 
Initially, response to Mehunin and Meltzer’s petition among IDF reservists was 
lukewarm.  Several hundred soldiers signed; however, no soldiers actually refused 
mobilization.  As previously stated, public opinion supported a limited operation, 
attempting to alleviate the security threat of rocket attacks into Israel’s North.  As the war 
dragged on, and the IDF placed Beirut under siege, small numbers of soldiers went to 
military jails for refusing to serve in Lebanon.26  Yesh Gvul dedicated itself to supporting 
soldiers arrested, and raising public awareness of their acts of dissent. 
Public awareness of opposition to the war’s direction within the IDF came to the 
forefront of the war controversy in an event unrelated to the selective refusal of reservists 
to serve in Lebanon.  When presented with the IDF plans to end their siege and forcibly 
enter West Beirut, colonel Eli Geva, a decorated veteran of the 1967 and 1973 wars, and 
commander of an armored brigade engaged since the outbreak of hostilities, “struggled 
with his conscience and decided that he would have to relinquish command of his 
brigade.”27  In planning sessions for the Lebanon war, Geva was one of the IDF’s most 
outspoken critics, however he dutifully commanded his brigade in pursuit of the war’s 
aims until mid-July, 1982.  The specter that, “‘Going into Beirut means killing whole 
families,’”28 so upset him that he could not reconcile his conscience with his actions.  In 
an effort to cause Geva to reconsider, he had audiences with the Northern Front 
Commander, Major General Amir Drori, the IDF Chief of General Staff, General Rafael 
Eitan, as well as Defense Minister Sharon and Prime Minister Begin.  According to 
Ha’Aretz correspondents Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, after his audiences with the 
architects of the Lebanon war failed to convince him to remain in command of his 
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brigade, the IDF General Staff informed Geva that he “should not return to Beirut and 
that his service in the IDF was terminated forthwith.  When it became public in late July, 
the ‘Geva affair’ was an instant cause célèbre, revealing as it did the depth of misgivings 
within the IDF.”29   
Although the peace camp and the Israeli left championed Eli Geva’s cause – an 
active duty leader discharged for acting upon his conscience – the matter of reservists’ 
selective refusal to serve was problematic for them.  As stated earlier, anti-war 
parliamentarians, ministers, and political parties expressed disapproval of any mass 
galvanization of opposition to the war efforts as long as the IDF was fighting.  Although 
this position softened, especially in the left parties, such as Ratz and Mapam, leading 
figures of Israeli politics generally refrained from open criticism of the IDF.  The reaction 
of the largest non-governmental peace organization, Peace Now, was more interesting 
due to the equivocal support it gave the refuseniks.   
Peace Now, although determined to bring the legitimacy of the war into the public 
forum, did not want to marginalize itself by overt law breaking.  As Bar-On states: 
The argument for showing restraint was that once Peace Now had broken 
the law it would not only move outside the national mainstream but also 
legitimize law breaking by its opponents on the right, who might have 
benefited more than the left from such tactics.30 
Many of the original refusenik leaders, such as Mehunin, Meltzer, and Major 
Benny Barabash, all leaders of Yesh Gvul, were initiated into the peace camp through 
their activities in Peace Now.31  As such, during the Lebanon war, the Peace Now 
leadership addressed the issue of its ties to Yesh Gvul and selective refusal in general as 
follows: 
Philosophically there certainly is a limit to obedience, and circumstances 
may be created in which we too may decide to disobey…  [However] 
despite its bitter critique of the invasion of Lebanon, Peace Now does not 
think that this limit has been reached.  Yesh Gvul is not our rival.  In many 
ways they are a piece of our flesh and bones…individuals may have the 
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right to resist orders they feel they cannot live with, as long as they are 
ready to pay the price.  But as a movement, as a collective, Peace Now is 
not ready to adopt disobedience as its official line.32 
The act of selective refusal was conscious law breaking in order to protest what 
refuseniks believed was officially sanctioned law breaking, the war of aggression in 
Lebanon.  According to Barzilai, “Since many of [Yesh Gvul’s] members defined 
themselves as Zionists, they recognized the legitimacy of the regime and the government.  
Thus they were willing to suffer the lawful penalties imposed for draft-dodging.”33  
Refusenik acceptance of prosecution and punishment for disobedience during the 
Lebanon war highlights what they believed to be the paradox of that war, namely, that in 
a military conceived with the concept of ein brera – that enemies force Israel to go to 
war, waging aggressive war was unacceptable.34  As the Lebanon war dragged on and 
ignominiously ended, the notion that the government violated the social contract, through 
its misuse of the IDF, gained credence.  As a result, the propriety of selective refusal 
received attention in the debate that continued after hostilities in Lebanon ended. 
 
D. FROM LEBANON TO THE INTIFADA 
When hostilities in Lebanon ended, creeping lethargy entered the Israeli peace 
movement.  According to Bar-On, in the absence of conflict, “activists started to wonder 
whether the movement’s mission had ended, or whether despite past successes the 
movement had finally been defeated by the sad realities of the absence of peace and the 
continuing occupation.”35  Although the numbers of those refusing to serve in the 
Lebanon “security zone” fell, the issue of selective refusal did not fade from the public 
consciousness, and Yesh Gvul did much to keep the debate alive.  Bar-On states, 
“Perhaps its most significant contribution was the publication of a book, [written by Ishai 
Mehunin, who became one of the leading intellectuals of the refusnik movement] The 
Limits of Obedience, which sparked a lively debate in the media concerning moral and 
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political principles.”36  However, the debate over selective refusal was not limited to the 
literary world.  Individual reservists, refusing to serve not only in Lebanon, but also in the 
occupied territories, made the issue of selective refusal much more mainstream, and made 
Yesh Gvul’s leadership leading figures of the Israeli peace camp by the time the Intifada 
began.  As historian Reuven Kaminer states, “It could be said that even if the group had 
known that the Intifada was on its way, it could not have prepared itself better.”37 
Although Yesh Gvul took to the issue of selective refusal to serve in the occupied 
territories with aplomb, as a group, it did not seek to expand its mission to include the 
occupied territories.  Only after the IDF jailed six reservists in February 1986 for their 
refusal to serve in the territories did Yesh Gvul adopt an official position, supporting 
refusal to participate in the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.38  In March 1986, 
Yesh Gvul released a position paper expressing its support for those who refused to serve 
in the occupied territories.  That this position paper bore striking similarities and made 
many references to its initial pronouncements regarding selective refusal to serve in 
Lebanon was no accident.  It stated: 
We have taken an oath to defend the welfare of the State of Israel and we 
remain faithful to that oath.  Therefore we request that you [the Prime 
Minister] permit us to desist from participation in operations related to 
oppression and the occupation in the territories.39 
Yesh Gvul reaffirmed its patriotic commitment to defend Israel, but linked war in 
Lebanon and the continuing occupation of territories gained in 1967 as the same category 
of misuse of the IDF.  That Yesh Gvul remained organized at a time when the 
mainstream Israeli peace camp was not, and that its position vis à vis service in the 
occupied territories was timely almost to the point of prescience, made Yesh Gvul and 
selective refusal well suited to enter the mainstream of national debate during the 
Intifada. 
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E. THE FIRST INTIFADA 
Yesh Gvul’s protest against service in the occupied territories even prior to the 
outbreak of violence in December 1987 that became the Intifada gave the selective 
refusal movement a new degree of prestige and legitimacy in the peace camp.   Much of 
this newfound prestige came from the fact that Yesh Gvul’s position was unequivocal, 
that serving in the occupied territories was beyond the scope of Israel’s security needs.40  
Legitimacy derived, as in the refuseniks’ stand on the Lebanon war, from the fact that 
members had already served in the IDF, confronted the moral and legal dilemma posed 
by selective refusal, and accepted the consequences of their disobedience.   
As the Intifada continued, the debate over the morality and legality of the 
application of force, by the IDF, in suppressing the uprising reinvigorated the paradox 
raised by Yesh Gvul’s selective refusal to serve in Lebanon.  According to Bar-On, 
“Rabin’s directive to ‘break bones’… and other harsh measures being used by the IDF in 
an effort to suppress the Intifada, accorded special urgency to questions concerning the 
legality of orders.”41  In response, Yesh Gvul published its Guide for the Perplexed, 
advising soldiers of their legal and moral duty to refuse to obey unlawful orders.  
Kaminer describes Guide for the Perplexed as follows: 
It featured sections from the Geneva Conventions, court judgments and 
statements by eminent jurists explaining that soldiers who carried out 
orders to beat and victimize defenseless Palestinians in their custody were 
not legally protected by the claim that they were only carrying out 
orders.42 
The publishing of Guide for the Perplexed elicited an overwhelmingly negative 
response from the IDF and the government, which attacked Yesh Gvul as a subversive 
organization.  As the momentum of the selective refusal movement grew, the government 
began a systematic campaign against Yesh Gvul, probing its finances and investigating 
its members and activities.  Kaminer states that after the investigation concluded, 
“According to press reports, it was the Attorney-General, Joseph Harish, who was 
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determined to bring charges against the authors and the distributors of the booklet.”43  
Regarding Yesh Gvul, the government held that since selective refusal was patently 
illegal, “they could build a case against the group inciting individual soldiers to refuse.”44  
Other organizations within the peace movement viewed the campaign against Yesh Gvul 
as a threat to their own right to protest.  According to Bar-On: 
In their response to the police campaign against Yesh Gvul, the various 
peace groups spoke with one voice, issuing a joint announcement that 
declared, “We hold different opinions on the questions of the limits of 
obedience and the right to refuse, but the conviction that public protest in 
its varied forms is the soul of democracy unites us all.”45 
At the same time as the government pursued its campaign against Yesh Gvul, the 
IDF attempted to further discourage selective refusal by increasing the level of 
punishment.  In addition to the month in military prison that was the customary sentence 
for refusal to serve reserve duty, “the refusenik lost all compensation for reserve duty – 
which was usually the equivalent to his civilian salary for the period.”46  Eliminating 
compensation served to increase familial and social pressure on refuseniks, however it 
did not thoroughly stem the tide of those unwilling to serve in the territories.  according 
to Kaminer: 
Ranking officers who wanted to raise the price a reservist would have to 
pay began to advocate and implement a rather simple solution: If a 
reservist wanted to refuse his duty, he should be sent to prison indefinitely, 
until he changed his mind…  [The]  IDF could argue that the reservist 
could be remobilized after a prison sentence because he had not fulfilled 
the minimal quota that the IDF demanded of him.47 
The IDF approach to raise the cost of selective refusal gave the movement its 
cause célèbre, in the case of Rami Hason.  His initial refusal to serve in the West Bank 
turned into three jail terms between April 1988 and March 1989.  Like the Eli Geva affair 
in Lebanon, the peace camp rallied around Hason’s cause.  No less a personage in the 
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peace camp than Ratz MK Shulamit Aloni issued a statement to the Jerusalem Post, 
regarding Hason, saying, “What they are trying to do is give him life imprisonment.”48  
Sympathy for a refusenik from a Knesset member during the Intifada represents a 
significant departure from MK attitudes towards selective refusal during the Lebanon 
War.  That a member of the Ratz party expressed this sympathy is not suprising, but it is 
significant.  Together with Meretz, Ratz represents Israel’s third largest political 
constituency (after Labor and Likud) and form the second largest bloc of the Israeli Left.  
These parties are Israel’s most progressive, forming the base of the peace camp.  Their 
leaders, like Shulamit Aloni, and Meretz’s Naiomi Chazan are leading intellectuals of the 
Israeli Left. 
By systematically attacking Yesh Gvul and the selective refusal movement, the 
government and the IDF did what the Lebanon war was unable to do: shifted selective 
refusal from the fringes to the mainstream of the Israeli peace camp.  Although selective 
refusal was not a part of mainstream culture – its support existed solely on the left and far 
left – it lost much of its social stigma during the Intifada.  The debate over selective 
refusal even entered the realm of Israel’s leftist political parties, those that had rejected 
the idea completely during the Lebanon war.  According to Bar-On: 
The debate came to a head in July 1990…[when forty-four] Ratz members 
published a statement of solidarity with a colleague who refused to serve 
and had been sent to jail…  A heated session of the party’s executive 
committee followed, at the end of which the committee endorsed a 
resolution…[declaring] that the party, “opposed any refusal to serve in the 
territories or the encouragement of any such refusal…  [but expresses] its 
understanding of those willing to pay the price for their conscientious 
objection.”49 
That a political party (albeit a leftist one) issued a declaration supporting those 
who selectively refused to serve in the occupied territories, and that the peace movement 
rallied behind Yesh Gvul, illustrate the changing perceptions of selective refusal that the 
Intifada foisted upon Israeli society. 
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Although it rejected the notion of selective refusal with vehemence, the IDF was 
not blind to the moral and legal questions the refuseniks raised.  The use of military force 
in the Intifada produced an interesting dynamic in civil-military relations in Israel 
wherein the IDF leadership was forced to urge restraint upon the civilian ministers to 
which it answered.  When IDF generals were given ministerial directives to “break 
bones” or to shoot indiscriminately into crowds, the generals’ responses were usually that 
army operations are limited by the law.50  The IDF leadership decried that these 
ministerial directives did not protect their soldiers from criminal prosecution – a position 
remarkably similar to that advocated in Guide for the Perplexed.  Bar-On states that the 
generals further held that, “while the IDF can subdue the violence to a certain degree, at 
some point the government of Israel will have to deal with the problem through political 
measures.”51 
 Although the IDF actively prosecuted members who publicly advocated the same 
position that its leaders privately advocated among themselves and with ministers, a 
degree of sympathy developed within the IDF for the selective refusal.  As such, the 
phenomenon of “gray refusal” arose.  The gray refusal enabled thousands of soldiers to 
find ways to avoid serving in the territories without actually refusing their orders.52  
Examples of gray refusals included medical or psychological discharges, or transfers to 
reserve components that did not serve in the occupied territories.  Yesh Gvul supported 
the gray refusals as these refusals denied the IDF soldiers to serve in the occupied 
territories as effectively as did outright refusal.  Further Yesh Gvul held that its mission 
was to support those who refused to serve, but the manner of refusal, like the decision to 
refuse, was an individual act.  Since the IDF was able to call upon an adequate supply of 
soldiers to meet its needs, it often ignored the phenomenon of the gray refusal.53 
As stated earlier, although the actions of Yesh Gvul throughout the Intifada 
moved the debate over selective refusal from the fringes of the peace camp to its 
mainstream, center-leftists in Israeli society continued to reject the idea wholeheartedly.  
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Leaders of the Mapam and United Kibbutz Movement parties appealed personally to 
refuseniks in their parties.  One argument that resonated with left-wing soldiers was that 
the presence of humane, decent soldiers restrained unauthorized cruel or barbarous acts 
by chauvinists and right-wing soldiers.54  Politicians on the left feared that should the 
appeal of selective refusal spread, the IDF would be irreparably weakened and leave 
Israel unable to defend itself.  According to Ratz MK Yossi Sarid, “Refusal might spread 
and create a split that would undermine democracy and result in military weakness that 
could encourage aggression…  I have no assurances from Saddam Hussein or Hafez El-
Assad that they will be impressed by our moral rectitude.”55  These challenges from the 
left, although compelling, did not end the phenomenon of selective refusal. 
 As happened in the end of the Lebanon war, the conclusion of the first Intifada 
saw a diminution in the numbers and prominence of refuseniks.  This phenomenon 
receded to the background during the years of the Oslo Peace process.  As the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada grew, selective refusal once again gained prominence in Israeli civil-military 
relations, and once again moved towards the mainstream. 
 
F. SELECTIVE REFUSAL AND THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA 
The outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 created another peak in 
the volume of reservists selectively refusing to serve in the occupied territories.  This 
newest insurrection has borne out the trend that selective refusal is moving into the 
mainstream of Israeli public discourse.  In addition to Yesh Gvul, groups of refuseniks 
such as Seruv (Refuse) and New Profile have arisen to support refuseniks.  These groups 
have more ambitious political aims, such as dismantling settlements, and a mission “to 
turn Israel into a civil society.”56  Yesh Gvul’s website and current handbook for soldiers 
contains its traditional admonitions regarding the illegality of many IDF actions.  
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However, in its current literature, Yesh Gvul has specifically targeted many of the actions 
most vehemently protested by Palestinians and decried in international media: 
When you take part in extrajudicial killings (“liquidation” in the army’s 
terms); When you take part in demolishing residential homes; When you 
open fire at unarmed civilians or residential homes; When you uproot 
orchards; When you interdict food supplies or medical treatments – You 
are taking part in actions defined in international conventions and Israeli 
law as war crimes.57 
Additionally, Yesh Gvul has abandoned one aspect of the political neutrality that 
governed its support of selective refusal.  Current Yesh Gvul public information states 
that the money spent by IDF in the protection of settlements could better serve Israel’s 
infrastructure or social services, ending with the refrain, “End the occupation, public 
allotments to the disadvantaged, not to settlements!”58  Finally, Yesh Gvul relates the 
violence against Israeli civilians in the Al-Aqsa Intifada to the continued occupation, 
advising soldiers to, “Ask yourself whether your actions in the course of your military 
service…merely fuel the enmity and the acts of violence between us and our Palestinian 
neighbors?  You can stop the violence that breeds terrorism.”59 
One of the newer refusenik organizations, Seruv, takes a more activist position in 
its members’ reason for selective refusal.  It states, “We hereby declare that we shall not 
continue to fight this War of the Settlements.”60  Seruv’s refusal to serve in the occupied 
territories represents a new development in selective refusal.  Like Yesh Gvul’s assertion 
that the occupation is directing Israeli funding towards the settlements in the occupied 
territories, away from Israel, Seruv’s argument against service adds a political dimension 
to the moral argument put forth in the original instances of selective refusal.    Combining 
the political aspect to the moral argument for selective refusal adds the issue of service in 
the occupied territories to the list of reinforcing cleavages that became apparent between 
leftist/secular and rightist/religious Israel during the Oslo period.  In this case, the 
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political aspect of the debate actually widens rather than narrows the base of support for 
selective refusal. 
Evidence of the broadening incumbent-level consensus for selective refusal is 
illustrated in many instances throughout the Al-Aqsa Intifada.  For example at a peace 
rally in February 2002, participants included, “some of the army reservists who have 
refused to serve in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, Green Line: Students for 
Borders, the Meretz Party, Labour Party doves, the Kibbutz Movement…Yesh Gvul, and 
Gush Shalom.”61  That Meretz and the left wing of the Labour Party now openly 
participate in peace rallies with refuseniks and their organizations illustrates the 
broadening consensus that selective refusal has received in the Al-Aqsa Intifada.  
Feelings of frustration among the Israeli left with the heightened levels of violence and 
what they perceive to be the Sharon government’s retrenching for continued conflict has 
generated support for the selective refusal movement.  In an article in Ha’Aretz, former 
Attorney-General Michael Ben-Yair, a leading intellectual of the Labor party wrote: 
[Occupation] is the product of our choice.  We enthusiastically chose to 
become a colonial society, ignoring international treaties, expropriating 
lands, transferring settlers from Israel to the occupied territories, engaging 
in theft and finding justification for these activities…  It is against this 
background that one must view the refusal of IDF reservist officers and 
soldiers to serve in the territories…  Their refusal to serve is an act of 
conscience that is justified and recognized in every democratic regime.  
History’s verdict will be that their act of refusal was the act that restored 
our moral backbone.62 
Although outright support for selective refusal from such prominent figures is 
rare, expressions of understanding and “empathy” are becoming commonplace, 
especially among Israel’s left-wing Knesset members.  Meretz, the largest left-wing party 
represented in the current Knesset, has no official position regarding refusal.  (This is a 
huge step away from the outright condemnation of refusal in the Lebanon War and the 
qualified condemnation during the first Intifada.)  The party has no official position 
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because, “Meretz…finds itself in a state of slight confusion when the refusal to serve 
issue is raised.”63  Party leaders are now debating the degree to which they support 
selective refusal, rather than if they support it at all. 
The Israeli government still rejects selective refusal and sentences those who 
refuse to serve to prison.  However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that Israel 
disciplines refusniks with relatively light sentences,64 compared with those received in 
the United States for refusal to serve in the Gulf and Vietnam wars.  This statement 
reflects Israel’s sensitivity to the heightened scrutiny the issue of selective refusal has 
brought to its administration of the occupied territories.  Whether or not the increased 
violence directed against Israeli citizens during the Al-Aqsa Intifada has leavened or 
weakened support for selective refusal is yet unknown.  Increased casualty tolls have 
made Israelis less sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.  That Palestinian attacks occur on 
both sides of the Green Line weakens the position that occupation is the root cause of the 
uprising, and that the IDF incursion is unjustified.  In many ways, the violence of the Al-
Aqsa Intifada has hardened Israeli attitudes towards Palestinians.  Polling data from Israel 
after the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada shows greater support for a heavier hand in dealing 
with the Palestinians, as shown in the growing support among hardliners for Benjamin 
Netanyahu versus Ariel Sharon.  This trend does not reflect a re-marginalization of 
selective refusal in particular, but rather, a marginalization of the Israeli left and the peace 
camp in general.  The importance of selective refusal in Israeli society remains yet to be 
determined. 
 
G. SELECTIVE REFUSAL IN CONTEXT 
“As a democracy in uniform,” most of Israel requires most of its Jewish citizens 
to serve in the armed forces.  As a result, the IDF reflects the range of political positions 
in Jewish-Israeli society.65  Before the Lebanon war, every endeavour of the IDF had the 
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support of hegemonic consensus, thus the divisions in the Israeli polity did not factor into 
the conduct of the war.  Equivocal support of the Lebanon war became public protest as 
the war dragged on.  Parliamentary and political party avenues, however, closed to 
protest, thus dissent was driven into the arena of non-governmental actors.  Among the 
most novel modes of protest that arose was selective refusal to serve the IDF in support 
of action perceived to be unjustified.  Selective refusal was a fringe element of dissent 
during the Lebanon war, but came in from the margins during the first Intifada.  The 
moral argument that military force in the occupied territories was unjust became more 
compelling to soldiers ordered to participate in crackdowns, thus generating support for 
this type of dissent in the peace camp.  By the Al-Aqsa Intifada, selective refusal entered 
the mainstream of Israeli political discourse, as another of the issues dividing Israeli 



















III. THE HEGEMONIC PROJECT OF RELIGIOUS ZIONISM 
A. FROM RELIGIOUS ZIONISM TO JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM 
As described in the introduction of this thesis, Israeli identity is the product of the 
Zionist hegemonic project.  Viewed through the cultural lens of the founders of Zionism, 
the land of Israel had symbolic value, inasmuch as it was recognizable to all Jews of the 
world as their place of origin, however it had no special religious significance.  Apart 
from the mainstream was a small group of Zionists for whom the land of Israel was 
religiously significant, for whom Zionism was not a nationalist movement, but a religious 
reawakening, hastening the eschatological prophecies of the Jewish Bible.  This chapter 
is a case study of religious Zionism as an alternative hegemonic project.  It describes the 
attempt to reconstruct the hegemonic conceptualization of Israel in religious Zionist 
terms. 
 Israeli military victory in 1967, with its concomitant acquisition of territory rich 
with symbolic meaning for observant Jews, was a watershed event.  Religious Zionists 
were invigorated, equating Israeli conquest of territory in 1967 with the divinely 
mandated Israelite conquest of the biblical era.  The notion that Israelis were creating an 
exceptional era of Jewish history, hastening the coming of the messiah through their 
national enterprise, gained credence among those seeking explanation for the IDF’s 
“miraculous” victory.  Through military victory, religious Zionism transitioned from a 
fringe ideology to a significant movement on the right of the Israeli political spectrum.  
Religious Zionists became the leaders in the settlement of the occupied territories.  
Through lobbying, grass roots political organizing, and ostentatious (often extralegal) 
political activity, fundamentalist Jewish Zionists have consolidated political support for 
their settlement activities among the leaders and voters of Israel’s center-right.  Growing 
and operating in parallel with center-right religious activists is a clique of fundamentalist 
Jewish zealots, on the far right of the Israeli political spectrum.  These people are 
responsible for much of the anti-Palestinian settler violence and threats and acts against 
the Israeli peace camp.  Further, these are the people who threaten armed insurrection 
should the IDF attempt to remove settlements.   
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Inasmuch as a significant aspect of religious Zionist ideology is the sanctity of the 
land of Israel, the growth of the movement since 1967 problematizes any potential 
removal of settlements.  In this instance, the historic case of Yamit is illuminating.  IDF 
removal of the Yamit settlements in 1982 became a cause célèbre for fundamentalist 
Jews.  That the government of Israel would willingly exchange land for a final peace 
settlement with any of its Arab neighbors was a chilling realization for those for whom 
the territorial integrity of the land of Israel was the Will of God.  Action in Yamit 
inspired religious Zionists to increase the pace of settlement in the West Bank and Gaza, 
and create infrastructure, binding settlements to pre-1967 Israel, inexorably raising the 
costs of any possible withdrawal from the occupied territories.  This case study 
demonstrates that the attempts to redefine Israeli hegemonic consensus in religious 
Zionist terms has largely failed.  Religious Zionists have raised the cost of withdrawal 
from the occupied territories to be almost prohibitive on the incumbent-level.  However, 
that significant pressure to withdraw from the territories still exists illustrates the 
religious Zionists’ failure to attain hegemony. 
 
B. EARLY RELIGIOUS ZIONISM 
Mainstream Zionism was never a religious movement.  The original Zionists were 
secular Europeans, either bourgeois or socialist in their outlook; their quest to establish a 
Jewish state was a nationalist one, rather than a religious one.  Of the significance of 
Israel, versus other potential locations for the Jewish state, Theodore Herzl wrote: 
Is Palestine or Argentina [for example] preferable?   The society will take 
whatever it is given and whatever Jewish public opinion favors…  
Palestine is our unforgettable historic homeland.  The very name would be 
a marvelously effective rallying cry.66 
Thus for Zionists, the land was significant only inasmuch as it held sentimental, 
and therefore recruiting and fundraising value among Diaspora Jews.  In contrast to the 
unreligious (or irreligious, in the case of socialists and communists) outlook of the 
Zionists, a school of thought began that melded Zionist dreams for statehood with Jewish 
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eschatology.  This school, religious Zionism, viewed the Jewish return to the land of 
Israel as the dawn of the messianic era.  Zionists, no matter their ideological stripe, were 
acting in God’s will to bring about Jewish redemption.  The intellectual father of 
religious Zionism, Rabbi Avraham Isaac Hacohen Kook, did not view Palestine as a 
public relations tool of the Zionist enterprise.  According to Rabbi Kook: 
To regard Eretz Israel [the Land of Israel] as merely a tool for establishing 
our national… is a sterile notion; it is unworthy of the holiness of Eretz 
Israel…  Deep in the heart of every Jew in its purest and holiest recesses, 
there blazes the fire of Israel.67 
According to Rabbi Kook’s formula, secular Zionists were not dangerous false 
prophets by virtue of their disregard for Jewish practice, but rather, they were the tools of 
the Divine redemption of the Jews.  He wrote: 
An outsider may wonder: How can seeming unbelievers be moved by this 
life force, not merely to nearness to the universal God, but even toward 
authentic Jewish life…  But this is no mystery to anyone whose heart is 
deeply at one with the soul of the Jewish people and who knows its 
marvelous nature.  The source of this Power is in the Power of God, in the 
everlasting glory of life.68 
Rabbi Kook thus inverted the mainstream Zionist thought regarding the centrality 
of Israel in their enterprise.  According to University of Pennsylvania professor Ian 
Lustick, Rabbi Kook and his followers further postulated that Zionist “exposure to the 
Holy Land, complemented by their [religious Zionists’] own sensitive and tolerant 
persuasion, would eventually lead the nonreligious Zionist majority to acceptance of the 
halacha and understanding of the redemptive meaning of Zionism.”69 
 
C. FROM MARGINAL PHILOSOPHY TO ENTRENCHED MOVEMENT 
By designating him Chief Rabbi of Palestine, the British granted Rabbi Kook a 
measure of power and a highly visible pulpit.  However, his religious philosophy of 
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Zionism did not attract a significant following during the Yishuv era.  According to 
Israeli historian Ehud Sprinzak: 
Religious Zionists were part of the political, economic, and cultural fabric 
of the country, with their own variegated semi-private educational system.  
For many years, these people suffered from a major cultural drawback: as 
observant orthodox Jews…they were outsiders.  A main feature of modern 
Zionism had been its secularism and anti-clericalism…  The Zionist 
maxim of Sheilat Hagalut (the negation of the Diaspora) implied for the 
vast majority of Israeli Zionists the rejection of orthodox Judaism, its 
practitioners, and its symbols…  [Religious Zionists] were part of all the 
exciting developments.70 
The religious Zionist community paralleled the development of other ideological 
communities of the Yishuv/early statehood era.  The B’nai Akiva Youth movement 
indoctrinated young religious Zionists in the fashion of Betar for the revisionists or 
Maccabi and Hapoel for the laborites.  Religious Zionists sponsored their own kibbutz 
movement, Hapoel Hamizrahi.  The National Religious Party (NRP or Mafdal) became 
the political organization of religious Zionists.  Throughout the years of Labor hegemony 
in Israel, the NRP maintained its significance by creating a niche role for itself as a junior 
partner in Labor governments.  As junior partner, the NRP supported to Labor’s foreign 
and economic policies in return for concessions on religious and personal status 
matters.71 
At the same time that the NRP created its niche in national politics, Rabbi Zvi 
Yehuda Kook maintained the ideological essence of his father, Rabbi Avraham Isaac 
Kook’s messianic philosophy.  At the Yeshiva Merkaz Harav, he continued to preach 
about the mystical connection between the land and the people of Israel, and about the 
eschatological mission of the State of Israel.  Sprinzak states: 
Until the 1950’s Merkaz Harav was a small and unimportant religious 
seminary in Jerusalem.  The death of Rav Kook [the elder], in 1935, had 
left the yeshiva without a leader…  Starting in the mid-fifties, Yeshivat 
Merkaz Harav slowly became the spiritual center of the new approach to 
religious Zionism.  The new students listened attentively to the idealistic 
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and nationalist sermons of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda and to his very Israeli 
interpretation of his father’s books.72 
Students at Merkaz Harav came exclusively from the B’nai Akiva youth 
movement, however they did not accept their role as a marginal element of the Zionist 
enterprise.  Through their combination of Zionism and idealism, they developed two 
ambitions: to undo their parents’ humiliation brought on by their second-class role in 
building the Jewish state, and to outperform the secular Zionists.73  According to the 
teachings of the Rabbis Kook, all Jews would eventually come to realize the truth, that 
the State of Israel is not a normal state, but rather, the dawn of the messianic age.  By this 
reasoning, the young religious Zionists of Merkaz Harav were not marginal players, but 
rather the spiritual vanguard of the Jewish people.  According to Sprinzak, several of the 
most dedicated of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook’s devotees, in 1952, formed the “Gahelet 
(embers), which stood for Gariin Halutzei Lomdei Torah (a pioneering nucleus of Torah 
students).”74  This nucleus of ideologically motivated students became the original 
leaders of the most significant fundamentalist Jewish movement, Gush Emunim (Bloc or 
Community of the Faithful).  Thus through Gush Emunim, the nationalistic, idealistic, 
and mystical teachings of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, are dominant motifs of the Jewish 
fundamentalist movement.  An important Gahelet ritual – the Israeli Independence Day 
pilgrimage to Merkaz Harav to listen to Rabbi Zvi Yehuda’s sermon – took on mythic 
significance at the Independence Day sermon in 1967, three weeks before the outbreak of 
war.  Whereas the prospect of imminent war with Egypt plagued most Israelis with a 
sense of foreboding,75 Rabbi Zvi Yehuda’s sermon was fervently nationalist.  He 
sermonized: 
Nineteen years ago on the very night that the decision of the United 
Nations to create the State of Israel was handed down, as the entire people 
rejoiced…  I was unable to join their happiness.  I sat alone – quiet and 
depressed.  In those very first hours I was not able to accept what had been 
done, that terrible news, that indeed “my land they have divided” had 
occurred!  Yes, where is our Hebron – have we forgotten it?!  And where 
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is our Schehem, and our Jericho, where – will we forget them?!  And all of 
Transjordan – it is all ours, every single clod of earth, each little bit, every 
part of the land is part of the land of God – is it in our power to surrender 
even one millimeter of it?!76 
The significance of this sermon is not only in its timing, which for the Gahelet, 
after victory in the Six Day War and the attending territorial windfall, appeared to be 
prophecy.  It is further significant because it illustrates the expansionist ideology imbued 
in the young leaders of Gush Emunim and the settlement movement, which began almost 
immediately after the military victory in 1967. 
 
D. EARLY SETTLEMENTS AND EARLY SETTLER ACTIVITY 
The first settlement activity took place in the West Bank town of Hebron.  
Religious Zionists set their sights on Hebron for both religious and historical reasons.  
Jews (and Arabs) revere Hebron as the biblical site of the Tomb of the Patriarchs.  
Further, Hebron was the site of an original Zionist enclave in Israel, evacuated after 
rioting and inter-communal violence in 1929.  Finally, Hebron was also an important 
Palestinian town, thus the establishment of a Jewish settlement there, for fundamentalist 
Israelis, symbolized Zionist dominance throughout the land of Israel.  Sprinzak describes 
the original post-1967 religious Zionist foray into Hebron as follows: 
In 1968 Rabbi Moshe Levinger, one of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda’s most devoted 
students, led seventy-nine followers in the first Jewish return to Hebron.  
The operation began in illicitly moving into the Park Hotel in Hebron…  
This became the model for Gush Emunim’s illicit operations.  The 
unauthorized settlement was followed by a declaration that the settlers 
would never leave, and finally by an agreement to be moved to a nearby 
military compound.  It involved tremendous dedication, great political 
pressure, and intense lobbying.  Soon the government decided to establish 
Kiryat Arba, a new Jewish city next to Hebron.77 
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Gush Emunim’s action to create Kiryat Arba, near Hebron, and Elon Moreh, in 
1973, near Nablus,78 illustrates a pattern of illicit activity and confrontation with the 
Israeli government.  However, the government did not oppose all of the early settlements 
in the West Bank.  Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon planned the first government-
sponsored settlement in the West Bank in July 1967.  His plan called for the 
establishment of settlements in Gush Etzion and the Latrun Salient, abandoned to the 
Jordanian Arab Legion in 1948.  According to Israeli urban planner, and former 
Jerusalem Deputy Mayor, Meron Benvenisti: 
Allon argued that the permanent borders of Israel must be defensible from 
a strategic point of view and must depend on permanent topographical 
obstacles that can withstand the onslaught of modern land armies…  Such 
security borders must also, he argued, be political borders; the border 
would be political only if Jewish settlements existed along its length.79 
That the Labor government couched its settlement activity in terms of the quest 
for defensible borders, rather than in terms of reuniting Jews with sacred land, did not 
bother religious Zionists.  Rather, the government’s ignorance of its role in hastening 
redemption was part of Kookist theology.  As in 1948, the 1967 war ended with a 
cessation of hostilities rather than a comprehensive peace agreement, thus most Israelis 
believed that the IDF kept the peace through the maintenance of defensible borders.   
The initial military defeats of the 1973 Yom Kippur war illustrated the folly of 
creating a static defense, based on topographical features.  The Egyptian army easily 
breached the vaunted Bar-Lev Line in the Sinai, for example.  The folly of using 
settlements as integral defensive outposts in modern combat thus imperiled the settlement 
enterprise.  As such, the Israeli government returned to its role of reluctant partner in  
settlement activity after 1973.  From 1973 until the first Likud government in 1977, Gush 
Emunim, through its settlement organization Amana, became the leading settlement 
agency in the West Bank.   
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Whereas, all Allon settlements are agricultural collectives, following the Labor 
Zionist model,80 Gush Emunim pioneered a different type of settlement, the Yishuv 
Kehillati (Community Village).  Sociologist David Newman characterizes the Yishuv 
Kehillati as follows: 
Instead of a cooperative framework and home-based agriculture or 
industry, each individual would be allowed to establish his own private 
factory on land rented from the settlement, or even to commute to his job 
in town.  Virtually all of the highland area of the West Bank is within an 
hour’s journey of either Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, and the majority of settlers 
have their own cars…  The Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency 
rejected the concept as a viable settlement alternative.  Nevertheless, Gush 
Emunim adopted it as the most appropriate means of attaining their 
objectives.81 
In traditional, labor Zionist parlance, settlement connoted agrarian, communal 
living.  The agrarian lifestyle and its attendant Labor-Zionist ideology, did not appeal to 
Gush Emunim’s urban middle-class white-collar members.82  The Likud electoral victory 
in 1977 became a political windfall for the Gush Emunim settlement activity inasmuch as 
Likud was likewise not committed to Labor ideology.  Under Likud leadership, the 
Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency recognized the Yishuv Kehillati as a 
legitimate settlement type in 1977.  According to Benvenisti: 
The recognition of the Yishuv Kehillati as a legitimate “pioneering 
settlement” was not merely an ideological  watershed.  It meant that 
Gush Emunim would be eligible for Zionist financial support.  All 
“recognized” types of settlement receive financial aid in the form of grants 
and very cheap loans…  The aid continues until the settlement reaches a 
level of self-sufficiency and is capable of paying back the loans…  The aid 
is funneled through a central settlement movement, which coordinates 
development projects and tends to become a strong economic and political 
power base.83 
The availability of low-cost housing loans to construct new housing in bedroom 
communities surrounding Jerusalem became an attractive option not only for those 
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ideologically committed to settlement throughout the land of Israel, but also for those 
seeking a suburban lifestyle.  Thus with the approval of the Yishuv Kehillati, settlement 
construction and occupation increased dramatically.84  In order to distribute money for 
housing loans and grants to build infrastructure for the settlements, Gush Emunim created 
another powerful organization, the Yesha Council.   
The ideological children of Merkaz Harav, through Gush Emunim, revitalized the 
moribund religious Zionist ideology, and created a movement.  As discussed earlier, 
Gush Emunim became the parent organization to Amana, in charge of developing new 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and Yesha, the council of existing settlements in 
the occupied territories.  Concomitant throughout this time Gush Emunim also began to 
exercise its voice in the Israeli political arena through the traditional vehicle of religious 
Zionists, the NRP.  As stated earlier, since 1948, the NRP served as a coalition partner 
with Labor governments, supporting Labor policies of social democracy and foreign 
policy.  As with almost every other facet of religious Zionism, NRP  behavior began to 
change after 1967.85  The leaders of Gush Emunim formed a “Young Guard,” within the 
NRP, and began to influence the party away from partnership with Labor, and towards a 
policy of Jewish fundamentalism and territorial maximalism.  According to University of 
Wisconsin political science professor Mark Tessler: 
Thus viewing territorial maximalism as a religious duty, they endorsed 
Likud’s long-standing policy toward the West Bank and Gaza, and 
denounced Labor’s continuing advocacy of territorial compromise…  
Some NRP members began to assert at this time that retention and 
settlement of the territories would deepen the spiritual character of Israeli 
society generally and hasten the coming of the Messiah…  The NRP’s 
growing identification of religious goals with territorial maximalism has 
led it to play a leading role in political movements organized on behalf of 
increased Jewish settlement on the West Bank and in Gaza.86 
Taking ideological direction from Gush Emunim, the settler movement and the 
NRP acted symbiotically to further interest in settlement building.  Their support of the 
Likud government in 1977 created opportunities to expand settlements in the West Bank.  
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Settlement growth fueled support for the settler movement, inasmuch as even non-
ideological settlers benefited from Yesha monetary support.  Religious Zionist actions 
take the form of a Gramscian war of position, an attempt to alter hegemony across the 
institutions of civil society, waging an ideological and cultural struggle in addition to a 
political and economic one.  Through their war of position, religious Zionism began to 
occupy a major portion of the center-right of the Israeli body politic. 
 
E. YAMIT 
Although settlement activity in the West Bank began almost immediately after its 
1967 conquest, settlement of the less religiously significant occupied regions, Gaza and 
the Sinai, did not begin immediately.  As mentioned in Section A of this chapter, in 1975, 
the Israeli government planned and organized settlements in the Rafah Salient, a series of 
cooperative farms (Kibbutzim and Moshavim) with the city of Yamit as an administrative 
hub on the Mediterranean coast.  Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling states that, 
“Many settlers of Yamit and Sinai were not motivated primarily by nationalism, but 
rather by quality of life, financial well being, and the availability of relatively 
inexpensive housing.”87  The government envisioned the Yamit region as a hub for 
export agriculture, and further, held to the Labor Zionist ethos that settlement of the 
hinterland was essential to the defense of Israeli territory.   
The election of Menachem Begin to the post of Prime Minister in 1977, with the 
territorial maximalist agenda of the Likud party, further encouraged the religious settlers 
of the West Bank.  Begin’s rhetoric aped that of the Land of Israel Movement, thus his 
government’s entering negotiations with the Egyptian government of Anwar Sadat in 
1978 surprised most Jewish fundamentalists.  For the majority of Israelis, the prospect of 
exchanging the sparsely populated Sinai Peninsula for long-term peace with Egypt was 
very alluring.  That the people of Yamit would have to return to Israel, or that Israel 
would voluntarily cede territory, was inconsequential compared with the benefits of 
normalized relations with Israel’s largest and most contentious neighbor.  According to 
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Sprinzak, voluntarily yielding territory was unacceptable for the Jewish fundamentalist 
movement for whom: 
The fight was not just for Eretz Israel, but also for the Torah of Israel and 
for the people of Israel.  The retreat from Sinai and the evacuation of 
Jewish settlements were considered acts of sin, retreats from the course of 
redemption.88 
For fundamentalists, the prospect of Israeli retreat from the Sinai imbued the 
settlements there with the same religious significance as settlements in the West Bank.  
The settlers’ mission was no longer a selfish profit seeking, nor was it secular Zionist 
pioneering, but rather a holy act, bringing the Jewish people closer to redemption.  In the 
introduction to the special issue of The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science devoted to 
Yamit, editor and psychologist Erik Cohen describes the Gush Emunim infiltration of 
Yamit as follows: 
The Yamit area began to be penetrated by new “settlers” under the 
leadership of Gush Emunim…  In contrast to the earlier Israeli settlers, 
these intruders – technically operating illegally – were devoted to 
preventing the retreat and removal at any cost.  They established the first 
of their illegal settlements, Atzmona, immediately following the signing of 
the peace treaty in March, 1979.89 
Under the leadership of Gush Emunim, Israelis opposed to returning the Sinai to 
Egypt formed the Movement to Stop the Withdrawal from the Sinai (MSW).  Although 
the MSW membership did not exclusively contain Fundamentalist Jews of the Gush 
Emunim ideological stripe – many members were settlers from Yamit, or Kibbutz 
movement patrons of the agricultural settlements in the Rafah salient – the organizational 
strength of the MSW came from the fundamentalists.  Fundamentalist Jewish ideology 
thus became essential to the MSW.  According to psychologist Nuri Kilot, although the 
Sinai itself was religiously insignificant, the contest to stop withdrawal became a 
religious struggle occasioned by a fundamentalist dogma that “can be termed the 
‘sacredness of settlement,’ which, stated simply, held that Jewish settlements could not 
and would not be abandoned in any area of the ‘Land of Israel’ because settling the land 
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was a sacred mission.”90  Fundamentalists’ doctrinal opposition to withdrawal from the 
Sinai was pragmatic as well as philosophical.  “Anxiety over the opposition to the 
possible reversibility of the settlement stemmed from an ulterior fear: that withdrawal 
from the Sinai would lead to withdrawal from the West Bank.”91 
As religiously motivated settlers migrated to the Sinai, their settlement tactics 
imitated the initial settlement forays in the West Bank.  Illegal settlements created “facts 
on the ground” that settlers believed the government would be loath to remove.  Settlers 
further believed that once these settlements existed, negotiations with the government 
would legitimate them, as was the case with West Bank settlements.  According to Erik 
Cohen: 
The MSW… initiated an intense campaign among its members to continue 
the penetration of the Yamit Region.  The infiltrators created more illegal 
settlements, took up residence in the town of Yamit, and initiated other 
activities aimed at subverting the evacuation of the territories.  As the date 
of the final stage of the withdrawal neared, the time when the bulk of the 
Israeli settlements in the Sinai were to be removed, the Israeli government 
took steps to prevent further infiltration of the Yamit Region by MSW 
members.  In February 1982, the army closed off the area.  Infiltration 
continued, however, until the final days of the removal.92 
The MSW did not limit itself to illegal settlement and extra-parliamentary 
activity.  Rather, according to Lustick: 
When the Camp David Accords were signed in 1978 – a move that Gush 
Emunim bitterly opposed – it precipitated a crisis for Gush supporters 
within the Herut and the National Religious Party, both of which officially 
backed the accords.  One result was the formation of Tehiya 
(Renaissance), the first political party traceable to Gush Emunim…  
Tehiya was founded as an independent party comprised of both religious 
and non-religious ultra-nationalists.  Instructively, it originated in a 
meeting held in March 1979 at the home of Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook…  In 
the elections of 1981 it received 44,500 votes and placed three deputies in 
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the parliament: [ultra-nationalist physicist] Yuval Neeman, [and original 
Gahelet members]  Geula Cohen, and Hanan Porat.93 
The 1981 parliamentary elections proved that for most Israelis, lasting peace with 
Egypt was preferable to possession of the Sinai.  For the majority of settlers in the Sinai, 
who were motivated by desire for a higher quality of life rather than by ideology, 
withdrawal became a foregone conclusion.  Among the farmers and businesspeople of the 
Yamit region, “organized opposition dissolved… among prolonged and, for Gush 
Emunim, embarrassing negotiations over just how generous the relocation and 
compensation packages awarded by the government would be.”94 
Inasmuch as secular support for the MSW eroded after the 1981 elections, and 
parliament clearly favored withdrawal, the MSW concentrated on extra-parliamentary, 
religious protest in order to halt the evacuation.  According to Israeli sociologists Gideon 
Aran and Michael Feig: 
The symbols the MSW employed – such as songs, dances study of Torah, 
and prayer…sought to emphasize the momentousness of the conflict 
created by Jewish soldiers evicting Jewish settlers from Jewish lands, thus 
increasing  the trauma among those carrying out the evacuation.95 
As the evacuation drew nearer, fundamentalist activity in the Sinai increased, and 
the fundamentalists’ rhetoric increasingly sounded an eschatological theme.  Protestors 
couched the IDF’s forced evacuation in the terminology of the epic battles of the End of 
Days.  Sprinzak states: 
People fully expected a miracle to happen.  The religious-messianic 
psychodrama that took place in the last weeks of the struggle pushed to the 
front the most extreme religious figures, the mystical rabbis.  The ecstatic 
atmosphere rendered even some legitimation to very exceptional 
expressions made near the end such as Rabbi Moshe Levinger’s warning 
that suicide might be committed and Rabbi Israel Ariel’s call to the 
soldiers to disobey orders.96 
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The threat of violence between Israeli soldiers and citizens resonated within 
Israel.  The Israeli news media closely covered events as they led up to the final 
withdrawal from Yamit, including live television coverage of the “rooftop battle” 
between the last holdouts of the city of Yamit and the IDF.  According to Israeli political 
scientist Gadi Wolfsfeld: 
Most of this “rooftop battle” consisted of movement members trying to 
prevent the evacuation by throwing bottles and stones, and occasionally 
pushing ladders being used by the oncoming soldiers.  The sight of Jewish 
citizens of Israel “fighting” Israeli soldiers created considerable public 
controversy in Israel.97 
The interaction between the MSW and the IDF leading up to the final withdrawal 
from Yamit transfixed the state of Israel.  However, the protest was ultimately fruitless, 
the prospect of peace with Egypt too alluring.  For the members of Gush Emunim, the 
removal of Yamit was instructive, proving settlement beyond the Green Line reversible if 
the costs, both real and psychological, are low enough.  Perhaps the frustrating 
experience of the Sinai withdrawal led Gush Emunim and the fundamentalists of the 
MSW to a more militant philosophy and greater commitment to radical actions.98  Over 
the next decade, two divergent patterns are visible among the ideologues, disillusioned 
with the outcome of the Sinai movement: mainstream political activists redoubled their 
efforts to settle the remaining Occupied Territories, and radical fundamentalists formed 
(occasionally violent) splinter organizations.  Both of these efforts increased the costs of 
Israeli involvement in the Occupied Territories, and attempted to redefine the hegemonic 
construction of Israel in religious Zionist terms. 
 
F. POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION AND UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY 
It is important to note that developments in Yamit did not occur in a vacuum.  
Rather, the “trauma” of Yamit informed not only future settler activity, but also 
reverberated throughout the contemporary settlement movement in Israel.  From 1978 to 
1982, as events in Yamit unfolded, moderate religious Zionists redoubled settlement 
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efforts, and strengthened ties across the Green Line through infrastructure and funding, to 
prohibit a replay of Yamit in Yesha.  A segment of the religious Zionist population, 
however, could not brook with Likud or NRP support for settlement removal in Yamit.  
This element represented a radical minority of fundamentalist Jews before the Camp 
David Accords; failure to deter withdrawal in the Sinai only further radicalized them, and 
increased their representation in the religious Zionist camp. 
Thus throughout the 1970s, and early 1980s, as Gush Emunim consolidated its 
presence in the West Bank and in the center-right of the Israeli political spectrum, 
clandestine support for an Israeli radical right – independent of traditional Israeli politics, 
and devoted to messianic, nationalist ideology – grew and prospered.  Settlers in the West 
Bank armed themselves, often with IDF assistance.  A culture of vigilantism and militant 
defense of settlement activity in the Occupied Territories flourished.  After withdrawal 
from the Sinai, clandestine fundamentalist militancy became overt political and extra- 
parliamentary action.  As Israel consolidated its hold on the West Bank and Gaza, and 
dealt the Sinai to Egypt, religious Zionists maintained their dogma of the sacredness of 
the totality and unity of the land of Israel both through political activism on the center-
right and extralegal action on the far right.   
Tracing the growth of the Kach (Thus) organization, and the political activity of 
its leader, Rabbi Meir Kahane, illustrates the changing nature of the Israeli radical right, 
from illicit and insignificant, to overt and controversial.  When Kahane arrived in Israel 
in 1971, he achieved a limited measure of notoriety as the leader of the radical, 
American, Jewish Defense League.  “Since 1973 the well-known pattern of provocative 
visits to Arab villages was established.  Kahane, surrounded by followers, would come to 
an Arab town, demand to talk to its muchtar (village head), and deliver the message that 
there was no room for Arabs in the Holy Land.”99  In this early period of Jewish 
settlement in the West Bank and Gaza, Kahane’s ostentatious action was a sideshow to 
Gush Emunim’s political and settlement activities.  Further, the call by Kahane and his 
followers to expel the Arabs from Israeli territory was far more radical than any Gush 
Emunim formulation of relations between Jews and Palestinians in Israel’s newly 
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acquired territory.  Lustick describes Gush Emunim’s doctrine regarding the status of the 
Palestinians in Israel as such: 
The Palestinians have absolutely no legitimate claim to nationhood or to 
any part of the country…  Should they accept the establishment of Jewish 
rule over the whole land, various formulas of subordination, for arranging 
relations between Jews and non-Jews…can be discussed.  Although some 
of these formulas offer Arabs more than others, all share one fundamental 
principle – that whatever rights may be accorded individuals in the land 
(rights to own property, earn a livelihood, be treated respectfully, and so 
forth), no group…may be recognized as having any rights over any 
portion of it.100 
The distinction between the radical Kahane and the more moderate Gush Emunim 
position is significant.  While neither treats the Arab inhabitants of the occupied 
territories (or pre-1967 Israel, for that matter) as equals, for the radicals, relations 
between Jews and Arabs must be confrontational, whereas for Gush Emunim, a modus 
vivendi is attainable, once the Arabs recognize Jewish domination over the land. 
As settlement activity in the densely populated, often religiously significant 
regions of the West Bank continued through the 1970s, intercommunal violence between 
Jewish settlers and Palestinians increased.  Palestinians destroyed settler property, rioted, 
attacked settlers, and called for the destruction of Israel.  With each outbreak of violence, 
Kahane’s confrontational ethos gained credence.  “In 1975, according to Israeli police 
officials, Kahane began to build an anti-Arab terrorist underground, the TNT (Terror 
Against Terror) [in Hebrew Terror Neged Terror], which in the next few years would 
stage dozens of bloody raids against West Bank Arabs.”101  However, propinquity does 
not alone explain the increase in settler violence.  Violent acts, vigilantism, and armed 
fundamentalist dissidence proliferated largely as Camp David Accords threatened to 
unmake the ideologically constructed Holy Land. 
While Rabbi Kahane and his followers were the public face of confrontation 
between civilian settlers and Palestinians, after the Camp David Accords, others covertly 
took up the mantle.  From 1980 to 1984, a secret offshoot of Gush Emunim, which the 
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Israeli press dubbed the Jewish Underground, carried out violent acts against Palestinians 
in the West Bank.  At the time, these acts looked like vigilante organization among the 
settlers in order to fight growing Arab terrorism.102  Jewish underground plotters attacked 
three Arab mayors in the West Bank, attacked the Muslim college in Hebron, and 
attempted to blow up five Palestinian passenger buses.103  Although these violent acts 
garnered much media attention in Israel, they were not the sine qua non of armed action 
by the Jewish Underground.  Rather the Jewish Underground coalesced around a plot to 
detonate the Muslim structures on the Temple Mount.  But for lack of the authoritative 
approval of a rabbi, the Jewish Underground would have carried out its attack on the 
Temple Mount in 1982.104  Jewish Underground members were ideological devotees of 
Gush Emunim and its mission.  All were young men, educated in its yeshivas, who thus 
looked to rabbinical authorization to act against the Arabs.  A collection of the Yesha’s 
leading rabbis authorized various Underground attacks that did take place including 
Rabbi Moshe Levinger, leader of Kiryat Arba, and Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, then a 
member of the Knesset.105  Ehud Sprinzak points out, “The rabbinical involvement in the 
terror acts that did and did not take place is of crucial importance.  It tells us that the 
radicalization process that finally produced terrorism within Gush Emunim was not 
marginal but central.”106  For the Jewish Underground, and those like-minded, rabbinic 
authority superceded state authority, especially after the Camp David Accords.  For those 
fundamentalists, the state proved to be at best an undependable ally in the cause of 
redemption, at worst a hindrance. 
The birth of an illegal, armed underground in Yesha is not a sui generis 
phenomenon.  Ideologically, the action of the Jewish Underground is an outgrowth of the 
eschatological theology of Gush Emunim, confronted by the crisis of withdrawal from 
territories.  Whereas the Israeli government might have been an ideological obstacle to 
these activists, it facilitated arming the settlers, and is thus complicit in the civil order 
paradox that resulted.   
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Following the Zionist pattern of hashomer security developed in the days of the 
Yishuv, the Israeli government believed armed settlers were essential to territorial 
defense.  According to Sprinzak: 
In 1978…Israel’s Chief of Staff, General Rafael Eitan initiated a policy 
making each settler community in the West Bank responsible for securing 
the area and defending itself.  Hundreds of settlers were transferred from 
their regular army units to the West Bank , to protect their own settlements 
and to secure roads and public property.  Every settlement was required to 
have a fixed number of soldiers, including officers.  They were to perform 
their active duty on a part-time basis while leading normal civilian 
lives.107 
At the same time the Israeli government facilitated the arming of the settlements, 
numbers of religious Zionists increased within the IDF itself, especially among those 
serving in the West Bank.  That enlistment of religious Zionists in the IDF increased is 
logical for two reasons.  First, universal conscription mandated that virtually all young 
people enlist, and as the movement grew, representation of the religious ideology 
proportionally grew.  Second, for those that believe in the sacredness of Israeli, Jewish 
territory, service in the armed forces in the defense of that territory is as much a religious 
obligation as a civic duty.108 
Another manner by which the Israeli government increased religious Zionist 
representation in the IDF was by enabling nationalist yeshiva students to carry out their 
compulsory service without undue interruption of their studies.  According to military 
analyst Stuart Cohen, in 1977, the IDF began to organize 
the hesder (literally “arrangement”) IDF companies whose personnel 
stretch their terms of compulsory conscription to five years, during which 
time they alternate spells of military service with study in a religious 
academy.  Almost equally popular are the “pre-conscription religious 
colleges”…whose students defer their military service for a year, which 
they spend in efforts to strengthen their religious affiliations.  Thereafter, 
graduates generally enlist – often en bloc – in elite fighting formations.109 
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A combination of ideology and IDF actions created the framework by which 
every Gush Emunim settlement was essentially a military unit ready for action.110 
Israeli leftists watched the arming of the West Bank settlements and the growing 
militancy of the Israeli right with alarm.  In 1980, four years before the discovery of the 
identities of Jewish Underground members, Israeli journalists on the left postulated, “that 
there is a secret movement that is a threat to the authority of the law in Israel, that is a 
threat to democracy…and may well be a threat to the government of Israel too.”111  
Leftists despaired not only over the threat to civil order posed by armed underground 
radicals on the West Bank.  They also feared for their own safety in the climate created, 
“Once an extremist group decides to take the ‘law’ into its own hands, carrying out acts 
of vengeance and retaliation against outside enemies, it soon begins to apply the same 
methods to those it calls traitors within the camp.”112  While this prediction might have 
seemed alarmist in 1980, later actions by fundamentalist zealots against Israelis 
illustrated its prescience, for example the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin.  At this 
time, the creation of an armed, ideological, militia in the Gush Emunim settlements of the 
West Bank was less threatening to the Israeli government than it was to its Palestinian 
neighbors because West Bank Palestinians were the greater impediment to settlers’ 
messianic aims.  Later, when the Israeli government threatened the messianic enterprise 
with “Land for Peace” negotiations with the Palestinians, its representatives became 
traitors to fundamentalist thinking, and thus vulnerable to the threats described above. 
As discussed earlier, the most radical and often influential Gush Emunim 
intellectuals enthusiastically supported Jewish Underground acts.  Support from more 
moderate religious Zionist leaders was equivocal.  They argued that while lamentable, 
vigilante acts were necessary in the environment wherein settlements confronted enemy 
Arabs, who will massacre Jews at every opportunity, and lived under a government, that 
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is more interested in political expediency than Zionist dreams of settling the Land of 
Israel.113   
The increasing level of settler violence in the West Bank from 1979-84 was an 
important factor in the leadership struggle within the traditional political arm of religious 
Zionism, the NRP.  The other major cause for “Young Guard” dissatisfaction with the 
NRP in this era was its support for the Camp David Accords, which through the cession 
of the Sinai and promises of limited autonomy for the Palestinians threatened the 
messianic enterprise of the ideologically committed “Young Guard” leaders. 
The Israeli government did despair over the increasing level of settler violence 
against Palestinians in the occupied territories through in early 1980’s.  From 1981-2, 
Deputy Attorney General Yehudit Karp investigated settler acts of vigilantism and 
violence.  Her report urged the government, “To find an urgent solution in order to 
prevent the deterioration and damage to the rule of law.”114  At the same time, Israeli 
state security began its investigation of the Jewish Underground, which culminated in the 
arrests of the plotters in 1984, as they conspired to detonate Palestinian passenger 
buses.115  Thus Sprinzak states: 
Such discontent has also been stimulated by the fact that [even] some of 
the NRP’s Young Guard moderated their support for Gush Emunim 
tactics…upon assuming positions of responsibility in the Begin 
government.  As a result, many supporters of the settler movement have 
concluded that other parties, such as Tehiya or Kach can better represent 
their views…  Movement in this direction  has been further reinforced 
by the emergence of Morasha [in 1984], a party established by Rabbi 
Haim Druckman, a former NRP member of the Knesset…  Morasha’s 
dedication to the fusion of religious Orthodoxy and militant territorial 
maximalism appeals to traditional NRP voters who identify with Gush 
Emunim116 
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According to Ehud Sprinzak, political splintering from the NRP during this period 
actually strengthened the political cachet of religious Zionism.  Minor variations in party 
doctrine created a thriving civic culture and a variegated political system.117 
 
G. THE JEWISH INTIFADA 
By 1987, the hegemonic project of religious Zionism, to incorporate the West 
Bank and Gaza into what Israelis recognized as Israel, appeared to be largely successful.  
“Those parts of the Green Line running between the West Bank and Gaza on one the one 
hand and Israel on the other had become nearly invisible to most Israelis.”118  Settlement 
construction and the construction of associated infrastructure, as well as the growing 
importance of the settler movement in politics, created a situation wherein many Israelis 
viewed the occupied territories as an extension of the state of Israel.  As Tessler says, 
“Not only did the number of Israelis living [in the occupied territories] rise steadily, 
reaching more than 70,000 (excluding East Jerusalem) on the eve of the Intifada, other 
Israelis frequently found themselves in the territories, traveling through the West Bank to 
get from one part of Israel to another, taking their cars to garages in Gaza…and much 
more.”119  The anti-Israeli violence associated with outbreak of the Intifada in the 
occupied territories in December, 1987, resurrected “the Green Line in the consciousness 
of most Israelis.  The territories [became] zones of insecurity which Israeli civilians avoid 
as much as possible and where even soldiers would prefer not to serve.”120  As the crisis 
deepened, the majority of Israelis in pre-1967 Israel sought ways to extricate themselves 
from the conflict.  Most formulations involved parting with some or all of the occupied 
territories.  That those not affiliated with the settler movement would willingly part with 
occupied territory in order to end conflict with the Palestinians illustrates that the project 
to incorporate the occupied territories into Israel failed to attain hegemony.  The religious 
Zionists’ hegemonic project to redefine Israel in eschatological terms has also therefore 
failed to attain hegemony.   
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Settlers and fundamentalists, however, steeled their resolve to keep the land, and 
thus – according to their ideology – stay the course for redemption.  They initiated their 
own protest, the “Jewish Intifada,” in order to prevent withdrawal from the West Bank 
and Gaza.  The religious Zionists’ failure to alter the hegemonic definition of the state of 
Israel relegated the “Jewish Intifada” to the loss of incumbent-level consensus.  
According to Israeli historian and social critic Benny Morris, “the return of Labor to 
power and the start of Israeli-PLO negotiations triggered a renewal of Jewish terrorism 
against Palestinians in the West Bank…and a campaign of delegitimization against the 
government.”121  As if negotiations did not threaten fundamentalists enough, the 1993 
Oslo Declaration of Principles – an agreement, in principle, to begin transferring control 
of portions of the occupied territories to Palestinian control, albeit over a number of years 
– was a negation of the religious Zionist fundamental tenet of maintaining the entire Land 
of Israel under Jewish control.  Opposition to the Oslo talks was instantaneous.  The 
Kach and Kahane Chai movements announced that they would carry out “provocations” 
in order to provoke a cycle of violence that would disrupt the negotiations and prevent an 
agreement.122  The most infamous provocation was the 25 February 1994 attack by 
Baruch Goldstien, a member of Kahane Chai, upon the Ibrahimi Mosque, the Muslim site 
at the Cave of the Patriarchs, resulting in the deaths of 30  worshippers.123  In response to 
this attack, the Israeli government outlawed both Kach and Kahane Chai.124  However 
the growing opposition among the settlers towards the government and sentiment in 
support of like acts continued, unabated. 
The prospect of transferring control of Yesha territory to the Palestinians 
radicalized previously moderate (compared to Kach and Kahane Chai, for example) 
members of Gush Emunim.  No longer trusting the IDF to protect settler interests, “The 
Yesha Council had been becoming increasingly vocal in supporting talk about reviving 
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‘Hashomer’ guard units to defend settlements throughout the territories.”125  Foremost in 
the minds of Gush Emunim leaders was the fear of a replay of the “trauma” of Yamit – 
IDF units forcibly evacuating settlers and bulldozing settlements.  To forestall this 
eventuality, Rabbi Shlomo Goren, former chief rabbi of the IDF, composed an in-depth 
religious ruling that prohibited the surrender of Jewish rule over any portion of the Land 
of Israel, and that therefore forbade Jewish soldiers’ participation in all operations that 
implemented the transfer of territory to Palestinian jurisdiction.126  The uniform 
unpopularity of the Oslo Declaration of Principles in Yesha communities, combined with 
growing settler representation among the IDF soldiers serving in the occupied territories, 
fomented a serious threat to civil and military order in the territories.  “At the beginning 
of December [1993] settlers accompanied by soldiers were filmed rampaging through 
Hebron, opening fire on Palestinian stone-throwers.”127 
As with the case of leftists’ selective refusal to serve in the occupied territories 
discussed in Chapter II of this thesis, the above-mentioned political unrest in the IDF 
illustrates the lack of incumbent-level consensus regarding the employment of the IDF in 
the occupied territories.  The centrality of the IDF to the Israeli state (discussed in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis) makes incumbent-level divisions regarding the 
employment of the IDF problematic to the Zionist hegemonic definition of Israeliness.   
After Oslo, religious Zionist perceptions of the Israeli government shifted.  
Whereas the government was once an unwitting accomplice to ultimate salvation, its 
propensity to trade away land, after Oslo, made it a traitorous impediment to the 
messianic age.  The legitimacy of the government, its laws, and institutions came into 
question.  According to Morris, faced with the real prospect of retreat from Yesha, 
“Teachers and rabbis inculcated the message that fealty to the Land of Israel is the 
supreme divine command, outweighing all other imperatives.”128  The culmination of the 
negation of Israeli authority by fundamentalist leaders was the 4 November, 1995, 
assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir, a product of Gush 
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Emunim yeshivot.129  The act of assassinating the Prime Minister alone, while audacious, 
does not illustrate a process of negation of Israeli authority among settlers; it could have 
been the act of a lone psychopath.  Amir’s act however, like those of the Jewish 
Underground before it, attained the patina of legitimacy by rabbinical pronouncement.  
For example, “Weeks before the murder a number of rabbis and cabbalists issued and 
published a curse…against Rabin, positing his murder, and consigning his soul to utter 
darkness.”130 
Popular outrage over the Rabin assassination staggered fundamentalist Jewish 
activism, and all but ended the Jewish Intifada.  However, Rabin’s successor Shimon 
Peres’ limited mandate constrained his freedom to implement the transfer of land 
Palestinians, and Peres’ successor, Benjamin Netanyahu, was not inclined to do so.  
Throughout the 1990s, the construction of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza 
continued apace.  In those respects, the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin effectively 
halted withdrawal from Yesha. 
 
H. YAMIT IN YESHA? 
The threat of renewed settler violence, a veritable replay of the Jewish Intifada, 
this time concomitant with the Al-Aqsa Intifada, re-emerged in 2002, when the National 
Unity government took action to remove settlement outposts in the West Bank.  The 
settlement outposts are not legal settlements, rather they are uninhabited or not 
permanently inhabited structures, usually built near a religious site (for Jews or Muslims), 
or on the site of previous inter-communal violence.  In June 2002, the Defense Ministry 
began to study outpost removal, “Because of difficulties encountered by the IDF in 
providing security for them.”131 
As in the case of Oslo, rabbinical authorities affiliated with Gush Emunim 
declared the removal of outposts to be sinful.  For example, Rabbi Zalman Melamed of 
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the Beit El settlement issued a rabbinical ruling directed at soldiers, stating in part, “It is 
completely and absolutely forbidden for any person in Israel to evacuate Jewish outposts 
in the Land of Israel, and just as a person is obliged to refuse an order that desecrates the 
Sabbath, he must also refuse an order to evacuate an outpost, even if he will be punished 
as a result.”132  Inasmuch as pronouncements such as this originate with rabbis, they have 
significant currency with religious members of the IDF.  Reminiscent of the Yamit 
evacuation, motivated settlers known as “Hilltop Youth” have been organizing civil 
disobedience against soldiers attempting to remove settlement outposts. 
The combination of pressure from rabbis and revulsion at the prospect of 
combating fellow Jews while in the act of outpost removal makes this duty traumatic for 
IDF soldiers, especially religious soldiers.  “Three young Nahal Brigade officers refused 
to take part in evacuating the illegal outpost of Havat Gilad, making them the first right-
wingers to refuse an order.  The three explained to their commanders that they were 
religious and lived on settlements, and could not be part of ‘uprooting settlements from 
the Land of Israel.’”133  That even the specter of Israeli withdrawal from occupied 
territory – potential withdrawal from an uninhabited outpost for security reasons – creates 
protest of this magnitude illustrates the progress religious Zionist ideology has made 
since Yamit in captivating the political consciousness of Israel. 
It is important to note that many in the settlement movement criticized the rabbis’ 
call for dissent, as well as selective refusal of religious soldiers in the face of outpost 
removal.  For example: 
Sha’ul Goldstein, head of the Etzion Bloc Council, criticized the rabbis’ 
recent rulings and accused them of harming the IDF.  “The rabbis’ call 
could destroy the army,” Goldstein said, adding…  “We must not bring 
politics into the IDF, and we must not encourage our children to hesitate to 
carry out orders, despite all our sorrow and pain at the outposts’ 
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evacuation.  In my assessment, an absolute majority of the residents in 
Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip does not back the rabbis’ decision.”134 
This criticism from within the settler movement illustrates the most important 
theoretical implication of this chapter.  Religious Zionists have failed to make their 
construction of Zionism - wherein Israeli territory is sacred, and that sacredness is the 
sine qua non of Israeliness - hegemonic.  Furthermore, this criticism recognizes that 
allowing political divisions to enter the IDF challenges the unity of that institution, and 
thus could challenge hegemonic consensus about the IDF as an essential institution of the 
Israeli state.  Most interesting is that a representative of the settler movement is self-
consciously willing to cede territory, and therefore to sacrifice his own ideological 
construction of Israel, in order to preserve hegemonic consensus of the Israeli state and 
its institutions. 
 
I. WITHDRAWAL PANGS 
Religious Zionists failed to redefine the hegemonic definition of Israel within 
their ideological framework.  However, through their settlement enterprise they created 
conditions within Israel that make withdrawal from the occupied territories almost 
prohibitively costly to incumbent-level consensus for any government to undertake.  The 
unrest created with the prospect of settlement withdrawal is thus politically destabilizing 
in Israel.  Among the most destabilizing facets of the political battle regarding withdrawal 
is the fact that many IDF soldiers within the territories are often sympathetic to the settler 
movement.  Various rabbis’ and political leaders’ condemnations of any cession of 
territory to the Palestinians as a rejection of Israel’s redemptive mission exacerbate these 
soldiers’ sympathies.  However, hegemony exerts a stronger pull than incumbent-level 
consensus; therefore, withdrawal from the occupied territories is still a possibility.  
Lacking an alternative hegemonic conceptualization of Israel that fits their ideology, 
religious Zionists will accept withdrawal from much of the occupied territories in order to 
preserve the existing hegemonic conceptualization of Israel. 
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IV. UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL: THE TRIUMPH OF 
HEGEMONIC CONSENSUS 
A. UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL IN THE MAINTENANCE OF 
HEGEMONY 
Chapter III discussed the failure of religious Zionists’ conceptualization of Israel 
to attain hegemony.  As Lustick states, “The biggest obstacle to hegemonic construction 
has been the vast Arab majority in ‘Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District,’ specifically 
the severe contradiction between the presence of angry and sometimes violent opposition 
of nearly two million noncitizen Arabs and claims that these portions of the Land of 
Israel had been transformed into integral parts of the state of Israel.”135  This is 
problematic because Israel retains possession over territory that germinates inter-
communal conflict, and about which no hegemonic consensus exists.  Israel’s quest for 
security in that territory, enforced by the IDF, challenges both incumbent-level political 
consensus and hegemonic consensus among its citizens due to the centrality of the 
institution of the IDF to the Israeli state.  Unilateral withdrawal from most of the 
occupied territory would resolve the crisis of hegemonic consensus regarding the 
employment of the IDF described in Chapter II.  Although politically difficult, failure to 
incorporate the occupied territories on a hegemonic level, combined with a desire to 
preserve the hegemonically agreed upon institution of the IDF, favors this unilateral 
disengagement. 
 
B. TOWARDS UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT 
Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, many opponents of occupation have 
abandoned their preference for negotiated settlement with the Palestinians in favor of 
unilateral withdrawal from the occupied territories.  Calls for unilateral withdrawal are 
phrased in terms consistent with the existing hegemonic conceptualization of Israel and 
the IDF described in the introduction to this thesis.  They call for the IDF to return to its 
defensive mission within the borders of Israel.  Further, they demonstrate a desire to 
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53 
separate from the Palestinians as a way of extricating themselves from a “war of choice” 
in the occupied territories.  This desire conveys the hegemonic consensus that Israel is a 
fundamentally peaceful nation and that conflict should be ein brera, forced upon Israel 
rather than sought out. 
The power struggle for control of the Labor Party following the collapse of the 
National Unity government in 2002 invigorated the demand for unilateral withdrawal.  In 
the face of deepening military incursions into the occupied territories, and with no 
resolution to the Al-Aqsa uprising on the military or political horizons, Labor leaders 
vying to lead their party sought to offer an alternative to the conflict.  Labor MK, and 
third-place finisher in the Labor party election of November, 2002, Haim Ramon: 
Was one of the first people in the peace camp to draw decisive 
conclusions from the collapse of the peace process.  He called for a 
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and most of the West Bank, and was one 
of the first to demand construction of a fence separating the West Bank 
from Israel, an idea that has become the [political] consensus.136 
Although Ramon did not win the Labor elections, the winner, Amram Mitzna, 
supported his calls for unilateral withdrawal and separation.  In fact, Mitzna’s proposal 
for a unilateral solution to the Al-Aqsa Intifada is even more radical than Ramon’s.  
According to Ha’Aretz: 
Mitzna’s diplomatic-security message is clear.  He is ready to resume 
negotiations immediately, with any Palestinian leader willing to do so.  If 
there are no negotiations, he will strive for physical and political 
separation between Israel and the territories via a deep unilateral 
withdrawal and rapid construction of an effective security fence.137 
Mitzna’s platform resonates because it evokes the hegemonic consensus of 
Israel’s security established by Zionist leaders at the state’s foundation.  He suggests that 
without the occupied territories, Israel could return to the state of ein brera, potentially in 
conflict with a neighboring state (in this case a Palestinian state), but not a conflict of 
choice. 
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Seeking physical separation from the occupied territories in order to facilitate 
defense of Israel is not a policy exclusive to the Labor opposition.  One facet of Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon’s “Operation Defensive Shield” was the construction of a security 
wall between the Israeli population and the Palestinian population of the West Bank.  
Sharon’s defensive wall exists entirely in the occupied territories, and accompanied a 
military re-occupation of the West Bank.  Nonetheless, opponents of Sharon’s policies 
recognized the potential for the defensive posture of “Operation Defensive Shield” to 
mutate into a defensive posture that permanently separates the Israeli population from 
Palestinian territory.  As columnist Yisrael Harel wrote in Ha’Aretz: 
Exactly 35 years after the Six Day War and after two years of ruthless, 
unending, terrorist warfare, the government of Israel – unable to withstand 
the pressures of an exhausted public and of past and present senior 
officials in the defense establishment – has decided to build a security 
separation line that will generally match the 1949 armistice lines.  And 
that line will of necessity – and not only because what’s far from the eye is 
far from the heart – become the political separation line.138 
That the security wall is a return to the Green Line is not entirely true.  Sharon’s 
proposed defensive perimeter encapsulated occupied territories settled by Jews including 
many of the Yishuv Kehillatim of the West Bank and much of East Jerusalem. 
In the debate over unilateral disengagement, religious Zionists opposed to 
withdrawal largely abandoned the language of their own hegemonic project, the 
sacredness of Israeli territory.  Rather, they join the debate in the terms of original Zionist 
hegemonic consensus, that the Arabs are waging war against the existence of the Israeli 
state, rather than just the occupation.  An example of this is found in Yisrael Ariel’s 
editorial from Hatzofe, the news organ of the NRP: 
Mitzna is willing to forgo the state of Israel in advance and announce on a 
one-sided arrangement.  He is not afraid of making such declarations, even 
if the Palestinians will not accept it.  He does not, however, answer 
questions that pertain to our existence.  Will such an agreement not 
constitute the victory of terrorism?  Will it really end the war, or perhaps it 
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would only make the Palestinian struggle against the very existence of the 
state of Israel continue?139 
In the above passage, Ariel characterizes the Palestinian uprising as another phase 
in the Arab struggle to destroy Israel, another war of no choice.  On one level, Arab 
action in the Al-Aqsa Intifada reinforces this sentiment.  Attacks against Jewish civilians 
on both sides of the Green Line created a sense of insecurity throughout Israel.  As 
described in Chapter II, the crisis of hegemonic consensus regarding the employment of 
the IDF in occupation is countered by the desire to strike at the sources of insecurity. 
However, after two violent uprisings many Israelis recognize the occupied 
territories as alien land, and its population as hostile to the people of Israel.  The original 
hegemonic construction of the state of Israel, born of conflict with its Arab neighbors, 
and thus a militarized society prepared to defend its survival, engenders a degree of 
comfort among Israelis with this definition of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. 
 
C. YAMIT AS A PRESCRIPTIVE MODEL 
Just as religious Zionists feared, there are many parallels between potential Israeli 
unilateral disengagement from the occupied territories and the negotiated withdrawal 
from Yamit.  According to psychologist Gabriel Sheffer, in Yamit, “a vast majority 
generally supported the peace treaty with Egypt because of their fatigue with wars and 
conflict with the Arabs.  More significantly, this majority was ready to acknowledge that 
peace would require the removal of settlements.”140  Mounting casualty tolls and 
international opprobrium caused by the Al-Aqsa Intifada have again fatigued the Israeli 
polity with conflict.   
Sheffer states that, “The government [through the IDF] not the general public or 
the parties’ machineries, was the chief actor in the Sinai evacuation.”141  Hegemonic 
definitions of the persistent state of conflict created the conditions of the militarized state.  
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Under these conditions, the Israeli government had significant latitude to employ the IDF 
to remove settlements in Yamit in order to aid the defense of the nation, despite the 
objections of a segment of the Israeli population.  As shown in Chapter III, in the wake of 
the religious Zionists’ failure to change the hegemonic consensus operating in Yamit, the 
same conditions apply to withdrawal from the occupied territories.  Withdrawal is a 
political question, albeit a contentious one, but not a threat to regime stability. 
In the case of withdrawal from Yamit, “despite gloomy predictions or wishful 
thinking of radical opponents, no popular uprising against the evacuation occurred, for 
these opponents failed to mobilize large groups to stage greater opposition to the 
government.”142  The protest against the Yamit evacuation reflected turmoil in the 
incumbent-level consensus, not the hegemonic.  Although incumbent-level identification 
with settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is greater than identification with the Yamit 
settlements, leaders such as Amram Mitzna believe the challenge is still political, not 
hegemonic.  He says: 
I think that the threats of a civil war and the harsh scenes we see…when 
we try to evacuate a trailer from illegal settlements – all this is actually a 
political campaign to scare the Israeli public into believing that the 
situation is in effect irreversible.  I believe that when an elected 
government in Israel will pass decisions, albeit tough ones, the vast 
majority of these people – who are devoted and loyal to the state of Israel 
and who live today in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza – will comply with the 
government’s call to return home, because this is what real Israeli 
patriotism is today.143 
Mitzna makes this claim because the original Zionist hegemonic construction of 
Israel remains intact.  Religious Zionists undertook a war of position to alter the 
hegemonic conceptualization of Israel, however their project did not succeed.  The 
strength of hegemony causes religious Zionists to thus abandon their political preference 
for territory when it destabilizes hegemonic consensus.  The strength of hegemony paves 
the way for unilateral disengagement from the occupied territories. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In the pursuit of the creation of the Israeli nation-state, Zionists created a civil 
Israeli identity, of which Jewish religio-ethnic affiliation is only a facet.  The Zionist 
hegemonic project created the conditions wherein, in addition to Jewish ethnicity, Israeli 
identity involves participation in the Israeli state.  The exemplary institution of the Israeli 
state is the IDF.  It represents the Israeli state’s greatest extractive capacity, and is unique 
among nations in the degree to which it extracts from its citizenry. 
The introduction of this thesis discusses Israel as a socially constructed entity; 
therefore, hegemonic consensus is essential for the body politic to support Israel’s 
institutions.  Challenges to hegemonic consensus challenge people’s perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the regime that governs them.  Inasmuch as the IDF is a pillar of the Israeli 
hegemonic conceptualization of Israel, to challenge the institution of the IDF is to 
challenge Israel on a hegemonic, or regime level.  Hegemonic consensus of the IDF 
depicts a defensive force, created and maintained to defend against the hostile 
environment that constantly imperils Israel.  The fundamental expression of the danger 
that justifies IDF existence and action is the notion that Israel’s wars are fought ein brera, 
without choice.  The lack of consensus regarding the choice to employ the IDF, originally 
in Lebanon, but especially in the occupied territories, challenges the hegemonically 
accepted construction of the IDF.  Selective refusal to serve in the IDF is a forceful 
expression of the challenges to the Israeli government generated by lack of consensus 
regarding the IDF.  Increasing acceptability of selective refusal among the Israeli polity 
illustrates the fundamental challenge occupation poses to hegemonic consensus, and thus 
to regime stability in Israel. 
Not all Israelis accept the hegemonic conceptualization of Israel or of the IDF.  
Religious Zionists undertook a hegemonic project to alter the original Zionist hegemony, 
to redefine Israeliness in religious terms.  A fundamental tenet of the religious Zionists’ 
conceptualization was the sacredness of all Israeli territory, even territory occupied after 
the 1967 War.  Religious Zionists waged a Gramscian war of position to reconfigure 
hegemonic consensus in Israel to their own understanding.  Their hegemonic project 
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failed to alter the fundamental hegemonic construction of the state of Israel, however it 
raised the incumbent-level costs of withdrawal from the occupied territories to an almost 
prohibitive level. 
Occupation threatens to undermine hegemonic consensus about Israel.  As a 
result, Israelis’ desire to maintain existing hegemonic consensus, the Zionist 
conceptualization of the state of Israel, should in the end be sufficient to overcome any 
political desire to maintain possession of the occupied territories.  Thus, Israel is able to 
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